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TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD: EDUCATION CHOICES, JOB SEARCH
AND LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES
Darian Naidoo, Ph.D.
The University of Sydney 2014
Imperfect information about the costs and benefits of education or about job
opportunities may imply that youth will not always make the right investments in
education or be matched with the right jobs. This thesis investigates two research
questions centred on the transition to adulthood: how to inform youth about the
returns to education and what are the wage effects of using social networks to find
jobs. These questions are considered in the context of South Africa, using data
from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), a longitudinal study of youth.
Regarding the first question, existing research on the impact of information
interventions has largely ignored the importance of the sequential nature of edu-
cation investment and heterogeneity in the returns to education, two factors that
may affect the impact of information interventions. This thesis addresses this gap
in the literature by using a sequential decision making model of investment in ed-
ucation, to investigate the importance of the (in)accuracy of expectations of the
return to grade 12 in South Africa. This model allows us to consider how agents
may update their expectations in response to new information, when making se-
quential investment decisions. We find that even if agents respond rationally and
are provided with correct information, the accuracy of their expectations may be
reduced possibly leading to sub-optimal educational choices.
Although it is well known that social networks are productive, in the sense
that they increase the probability of finding a job, much less is known about the
quality of the match between job seeker and employee that is promoted through
their use and, in particular, the impacts on wages, resulting from their use. This
thesis estimates the impact of social networks on wages for youth in South Africa.
It concludes that the use of social networks is associated with wage discounts
and that decreasing social distance (the use of relatives rather than friends), is
associated with greater wage penalties.
These conclusions have important policy implications. Firstly, we conclude that
information interventions should not be conducted without ex ante consideration
of the issues of heterogeneity, sequential investment and the process of updating
of expectations. Such analysis is likely to be less costly than conducting field
experiments and provides the benefit of anticipating negative impacts before they
occur. Secondly, the negative impact on wages of the use of social networks to
find jobs suggests that in the context of South Africa, there may be a role for
interventions that assist youth to find employment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Economic transitions to adulthood
According to the 2007 World Development Report (World Bank, 2006), there are
two central and intimately linked economic decisions in the transition into adult-
hood. The first is progression through education in preparation for work. The
second is entry into the labour market. Together, they allow youth to transition
from being dependents who are building human capital with economic support
from their families and others, to economically independent agents that use their
human capital productively in work.
Across countries, the nature and timing of these decisions varies considerably
because of differences in education systems and labour market institutions. How-
ever, some basic characteristics of these transitions are almost universally true,
with two characteristics being particularly relevant to this thesis. Firstly, decisions
regarding education are intimately linked to future labour market outcomes. Be-
cause education has well-documented returns in the labour market (Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos, 2004), expected labour market returns may also have a direct impact
on education investment decisions (Manski, 1993). Secondly, every job must be
found through some type of search method. It is possible that different types of
job search methods lead to differences in the quality of the match between youth
and the jobs they find (Loury, 2006). Both decisions are characterised by risk and
imperfect information, with important welfare consequences in both the short and
1
2the long term.
Lack of knowledge about future labour market returns associated with different
levels and types of education or capacity to make such an investment (Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd, 2006, Stange, 2012) may lead to suboptimal decisions, both
in terms of private and public costs. For example, a young student who spends
a year in education and fails, will necessarily incur some direct costs of education
and the opportunity cost of his/her time, and these costs may not have a payoff if
only completed grades/degrees are rewarded in the labour market. Perhaps of even
greater concern, a student dropping out of school earlier than they should carries
long term consequences for both the youth (through reduced lifetime earnings) and
society (if underinvestment in education leads to lower overall labour productivity).
Having decided to enter the labour market, youth must decide how much time
and resources to spend on job search. The way that jobs are searched for has
important implications regarding the costs and potential benefits of job search, in
terms of the characteristics of the job eventually found. While the use of friends
and relatives is usually perceived to have lower costs than formal search methods
Holzer (1987), it may also have consequences in terms of labour market outcomes,
measured by the probability of finding a job and the characteristics of the job
found. Although much is known about the fact that the use of social contacts is
productive (in the sense that it increases the probability of receiving a job offer), the
impact of informal search on wages is less clear: finding employment in relatively
unsuitable jobs may be associated with wage penalties (Loury, 2006), which may
have to be weighted against the costs associated with unemployment, which may
be long lasting and “scarring” (Heckman and Borjas, 1980, Arulampalam, Gregg,
and Gregory, 2001).
3This thesis addresses research questions that are suggested by these decisions.
The first question, which is the focus of chapter 2, is how to inform youth about
the returns to education. The second, addressed in chapter 3, is whether the
use of social networks have important wage effects. A preview of the approaches
and main results of these two chapters is presented in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, after
briefly introducing issues of education investment and job search in the South
African context (Section 1.2), which is the focus of the analysis of this thesis. We
conclude in Chapter 4, with a discussion of the policy implications of this analysis,
in particular in terms of interventions designed to assist youth with information
that may help youth make better choices.
1.2 Education investment and job search in South Africa
In South Africa, there are marked inequalities in educational attainment between
race groups, at least in part due to the legacy of apartheid. Particularly, while
there are high rates of enrolment, many youth repeat grades in primary and high
school, especially African youth and to a lesser extent Coloured youth (Pugatch,
2012, Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt, 2006). In addition, Whites complete on
average more education than Coloureds who in turn complete more education than
Africans. 1
Educational inequality across race groups is related to economic inequality
across races groups as there are increasing returns to investment in education
1I adopt the labels used in CAPS and by Seekings and Nattrass (2005) and
use the word ‘African’ to refer to peoples classified under apartheid as “native”,
“bantu” or “black”, the word ‘White’ to refer to people classified as European or
white, and the word ‘Coloured’ to refer to the people that don’t fit the first two
categories, including descendants of the indigenous Khoi and San, the descendants
of “Malay” slaves from Indonesia and those with mixed race ancestry.
4and, for all levels of education, average earnings diverge by race, with Whites
earning more than Coloureds who in turn earn more than Africans (Keswell and
Poswell, 2004). The economic returns to education are a central motivation in post
high school education choices, with two of the top three motivations for pursuing
higher education being expected increased employment probability and expected
increased income, following higher education completion (Cosser and du Toit,
2002).
However, there has been no research that assesses the accuracy of earnings ex-
pectations in South Africa and how they may differ by race. Beutel and Anderson
(2007) consider the amount of education youth and their parents expect to com-
plete and find it to be generally high across races, but this doesn’t mean that youth
are adequately aware of the economic returns to education. Even if imperfect infor-
mation about such returns only plays a small role in explaining underinvestment
in education in South Africa, the cost effectiveness of information interventions
designed to address such gaps (Nguyen, 2008) may make them worthwhile .
The definition of the unemployment rate and its relation with job search be-
haviour is one prominent and controversial policy debate in South Africa, centred
on the relative merits of the broad and narrow definitions of unemployment. The
narrow definition of unemployment (which is the official definition used by Statis-
tics South Africa) only includes those that have searched for work in the past week,
while the broad definition also includes those that want work but are not actively
searching for it. It has been argued by Kingdon and Knight (2006) that the broad
definition should be preferred over the official definition as the non-searching un-
employed display key characteristics similar to that of the formally unemployed.
In particular, they are economically more deprived than the searching unemployed
5while not being any happier. Kingdon and Knight (2006) also suggest that high
search costs and high rates of local unemployment are associated with job seeker
discouragement. This implies that the common labour market information prob-
lem of workers and firms not being able to find each other in appropriate matches,
may be particularly acute in South Africa where searching for work is a costly and
often unproductive activity.
Although receiving much less attention than the formally unemployed, dis-
couraged job seekers in South Africa numbered over 1 million people during the
first quarter of 2008 (Statistics South Africa, 2008). This represents 3.8% of the
working age population and is equivalent to 28% of those formally unemployed.
Interestingly, there is an over representation of youth in both the measure of for-
mal unemployment and the measure of the non-searching unemployed (Kingdon
and Knight, 2007). While there may be many youth that want work but do not
actively search for work, this does not mean that such youth will not be able find
employment. It is likely that many of the non-searching unemployed find work
through family and friends (Burns, Godlonton, and Keswell, 2010). However, the
consequences on labour market outcomes of using different types of job search
methods (including finding work through networks when not actively searching)
remain unknown. Thus, research on the impact of using social network to find jobs
is particularly relevant in the South African context.
Chapters 2 and 3 research the accuracy of earnings expectations and the impact
of networks on wages in South Africa, respectively, using data from the Cape Area
Panel Study (CAPS), described in Lam, Seekings, and Sparks (2008). CAPS is a
longitudinal study of a random sample of 4758 youth aged 14-22 in 2002 living in
the Cape Town Metropolitan Area. The study focuses on a wide range of impor-
6tant and related outcomes for youth during the transition to adulthood, including
schooling and labour market participation. All youth were initially interviewed in
2002 (wave 1) and then in 2003-2004 (wave 2), 2005 (wave 3) and 2006 (wave 4).
As CAPS contains data on observed and expected earnings, job search methods,
and an extensive range of demographic and background characteristics, it is an
ideal source of data for the empirical analysis in both Chapters 2 and 3.
1.3 Informing youth about the returns to education
The discrepancy between youths’ expectations of the returns to education and
observed market returns may create opportunities for low cost information inter-
ventions to improve the investment decisions of youth. For example, if students
drop out of high school because they are unaware of its economic returns, sim-
ply giving students information about these returns may change their investment
decisions.
For any given context however, the exact types of information that should be
provided and the likely impacts of different types of information, should carefully
be considered prior to conducting any intervention. As there is no theoretical re-
search that provides optimal designs for information interventions, an empirical
literature that favours field experiments has developed as a means of evaluating
different types of intervention (e.g. Nguyen (2008)). In chapter 2, we argue that
this is a problematic approach to address the question of how to inform youth
about the returns to education, given that such information interventions may un-
intentionally lead to some youth having less accurate expectations and, if effective
in terms of changing behaviour, lead them to making inferior investment choices.
This potential for harm has gone unnoticed because two key factors that impact
7on the likely effectiveness of information interventions, have been inadequately
considered.
Firstly, previous research on interventions has largely ignored the sequential
nature of decisions to invest in education and in particular, the significance of
the range of higher education options available to decisions made during high-
school. 2 Secondly, heterogeneity in the returns to education has also largely been
ignored. There is no empirical or theoretical research on the implications of these
two factors and how they impact on the effectiveness of information interventions.
Chapter 2 addresses this gap in the literature. Firstly, we use a sequential decision
making model of investment in education, that we call Real Options Pathways for
Education (ROPE), to investigate the importance of the (in)accuracy of expecta-
tions of the return to grade 12 in South Africa. This model allows us to consider
how agents may update their expectations when making sequential investment
decisions. While the way in which expectations of the returns to education are up-
dated has been previously researched (e.g. Wiswall and Zafar (2011)), it has not
been researched in consideration of the sequential nature of education investment.
Secondly, using ROPE, we simulate the possible effects on the accuracy of
expectations, of four designs of information interventions about the returns to
education. The first design is simply to provide information on average wages
conditional on the completion of grades 11 and 12. The second design is to pro-
vide information on average wages conditional on grades 11, 12 and for each level
2In the context I consider, South Africa, there are higher education options
that are only accessible after the completion of grade 12. While it is possible to
leave school before grade 12 completion to enter vocational education in the form
of national trade certificates (NTCs), these are terminal and do not lead to higher
education (i.e. NTC 1, 2 and 3 are considered equivalent to grades 10, 11 and 12
but do not lead to university.
8of higher education. The third design is like the first except that it accounts for
heterogeneity by providing average wages by race. The fourth design provides ‘full
information’, that is, average wages by race for all levels of education. For all the
types of interventions under consideration, our results suggest that each interven-
tion would be harmful to some youth. While the first and simplest intervention
may be harmful to some youth, the other three intervention designs do not of-
fer an unambiguous improvement over the simple intervention, even though they
could be considered as providing ‘better’ information. Results for the second in-
tervention show that even if the sequential nature of investment is fully accounted
for, and youth fully update their expectations, ignoring heterogeneity in the re-
turns to education means that this intervention may be harmful. In contrast,
results for the third intervention show that if heterogeneity is accounted for and
youth fully update their expectations, the sequential nature of investment means
that the intervention may still be harmful. Lastly, the fourth intervention design
demonstrates that even providing perfect information to rational agents could lead
them to have less accurate expectations and potentially, induce underinvestment
in education, depending on how the information is used.
Chapter 2 concludes that information interventions should not be conducted
without ex ante consideration of heterogeneity, real options, and the way in which
youth update their expectations. The unique contribution of this chapter is to
show that while ignoring any one of these factors is dangerous, the alternative of
ex ante consideration of these factors is relatively easy and insightful. While we
do not provide a definitive answer to the question regarding how best to inform
youth about the returns to education, we do provide theory and empirical evidence
that suggests ways in which youth should not be informed about the returns to
9education.
1.4 Social networks and wages in South Africa
The way in which a job is found may have a direct impact on the quality of
the worker-job match. While it is a stylised fact that social networks play an
important role in job search, their impact on labour market outcomes, namely
wages, is still disputed. The issue is important for two reasons. Firstly, if social
networks do have any bearing on labour market outcomes, this implies that labour
economists should not stick rigidly to the assumptions of neoclassical economics
that ignore issues of social structure (Mouw, 2003). Secondly, if social networks are
leading to a large proportion of poor quality job matches, this may be an argument
in favour of job search assistance programs as it indicates a failure of existing
labour market institutions to appropriately match workers with jobs in an efficient
manner. Particularly for youth, who often find work through social contacts and
suffer disproportionately from unemployment, understanding the impact of social
networks is an important empirical question as there is no clear agreement in the
theoretical literature regarding the overall benefits and costs of network use (Loury,
2006).
There are two competing hypotheses that summarise the existing literature:
The “good matches” hypothesis suggests that social networks are used to overcome
information asymmetries between workers and firms resulting in wage premiums
while the “limited choices” hypothesis suggests that networks are used as a low
cost but less effective alternative to finding jobs through formal search, resulting in
wage discounts. The predictions of these hypotheses have not been tested in South
Africa, where social network use to find jobs is known to be high among youth
10
(Magruder, 2010, Burns, Godlonton, and Keswell, 2010). Chapter 3 addresses this
gap in the literature.
Its first major contribution is to show that the use of social networks is generally
associated with substantial wage penalties, rejecting the good matches hypothesis.
In addition, this chapter considers the role played by social distance (the use of
relatives versus friends) on wages. We show that the use of relatives is associated
with significant penalties for all races, suggesting that firms may discount the value
of the information provided by referees if they are close to job seekers. This effect
is especially large for Africans, the group among whom unemployment is highest.
Chapter 2
Dangerous Information: How Should
Youth be Informed About the Returns
to Education?
2.1 Introduction
Consider a student that has just completed grade 11 and is considering whether to
enrol in grade 12 or enter the labour market. In deciding between these two options,
the student takes into account the expected lifetime earnings associated with each
option and the costs of education. The value of enrolling in grade 12 depends on
what they would earn if they entered the labour market following grade 12 and
on the value of the option of going to university following grade 12. Suppose that
this student expects to earn (100, 150, 300) conditional on successfully completing
year 11, year 12 and university, respectively. The true returns for someone with
her characteristics are (100, 150, 360), and these are double the national average
(50, 75, 180). This student underestimates the returns to university and the value
of grade 12 (which is influenced by the university option open with the completion
of grade 12).
We are interested in the following question: how could the provision of infor-
mation help such a student to make the correct choice about whether to enrol
in grade 12? Suppose that we design an intervention that provides information
11
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on average earnings conditional on different qualifications. If the student adjusts
her expectations and replaces them with the information provided she will, post-
intervention, expect to earn (50, 75, 180). Because these values are lower than
her initial expectations, the intervention led to a greater underestimation of the
returns to education. This example illustrates a key conclusion of this paper, that
more information may not always be beneficial. In fact, correct information may
even cause harm if it reduces the accuracy of expectations and leads to sub-optimal
choices, where ‘harm’ is defined as a reduction in the accuracy of expectations of
an individual that may result in an inefficient choice being made.
In this chapter, we argue that unless such potential for harm from information
interventions is considered ex ante in a sequential choice framework, this potential
for harm may go undetected. While we know of no paper that explores such
ideas regarding information interventions for the returns to education, the idea of
correct information being harmful is not without precedent in the literature on
the economics of information: Daley and Green (2012), for example, conclude that
“higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes” in a market for assets
where stochastic information (news) about the assets is progressively revealed to
buyers.
The policy relevance of interventions intended to change behaviour through
the provision of information rests on three assumptions. Firstly, that expectations
regarding the returns to education are inaccurate. Secondly, that the information
provided will affect expectations in a predictable way. Finally, that changes in ex-
pectations translate into different educational investment decisions (implying that
inaccurate expectations, and not other constraints, are an important determinant
of educational choices).
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Jensen (2010) is a leading analysis of this type of intervention, as it investigates
the effectiveness of an intervention designed to provide information on returns to
education to eighth graders in the Dominican Republic. The intervention was mo-
tivated by the puzzling fact that, despite very high completion rates for primary
school (around 90%) and substantial returns to secondary school (mean earnings
approximately 40% higher than for those with primary education), less than a
third of individuals completed secondary school. A survey of eight graders showed
that the perceived returns to education were quite low (supporting the first as-
sumption mentioned above). The provision of information on average earnings
conditional on the completion of primary, secondary and university education, to
eighth graders in randomly chosen schools, was followed, four years later, by an
analysis of schooling outcomes of recipients of this intervention. Compared with
a control group, the provision of information resulted in an average increase of
0.20-0.35 years by the students in the treatment schools, although for the very
poorest students the change in perceptions was not accompanied by a significant
effect on schooling. In addition, this increased investment in education is linked
directly to changes in expectations: when interviewed four to six months after the
intervention, expectations of the return to secondary school had increased for 54%
of the treatment group, compared to only 27% of the control group. These findings
regarding updated expectations and increased investment for the treatment group
support the second and third assumptions listed in the preceding paragraph. The
policy importance of Jensen’s study come from its cost-effectiveness: it costs very
little to provide the information while the impacts on schooling are substantial.
Nguyen (2008, p.4), for example, concludes that this type of interventions could
increase schooling by one year at a cost of US$2.4 per person.
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This paper is a discussion of the effect of some critical, but under-researched,
aspects of the design of this type of intervention. We start by developing an analyt-
ical approach that addresses two potentially important limitations of interventions
such as the one just mentioned. The first is to fully incorporate the sequential na-
ture of education investment, that is, the possibility that completing a certain level
of education is valuable because it creates the possibility of additional investments
in education (that are valuable in themselves). The second is the possibility of het-
erogeneous returns to education. The practical question we ultimately address is
whether the additional complexities that are introduced matter, in the sense that
they lead to different results from simpler approaches, such as the one followed
in Jensen (2010). As such, this paper should be understood as a cautionary note
regarding expanding or scaling up these types of interventions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly review previous the-
oretical and empirical work on sequential investment and option values in educa-
tion and on the importance of expectations in decision making, in particular with
respect to the role of subjective expectations of the returns to education. One
contribution of this paper is to link these bodies of work through an evaluation of
the importance of differences between subjective expectations and observed values
in a sequential decision making framework.
We then present in section 2.3, a simple model of the role of sequential in-
vestment in education, which we refer to as Real Options Pathways for Education
(ROPE). In section 2.4 we adapt this model to fit the context and the data we use,
the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) in South Africa. This data set is particularly
suited for the purpose of this study as it contains extensive information on indi-
viduals’ expectations on earnings across the years of the transition to adulthood.
15
Using the ROPE framework, we do not identify a large mismatch between expec-
tations and reality when focusing on the overall net value of completing grade 12
for Coloured and White youth (who form the most part of our sample). 1 However,
for African youth, the average underestimation of returns to education is 32%. If
we compare expected and observed earnings unconditional on race, there is on
average, an overestimation of about 11% of the returns to grade 12, hiding the
underestimation of Africans. We also show that measures of the accuracy of ex-
pectations are sensitive to the inclusion of the options of further study after grade
12, that is, the value of being able to enrol in tertiary education (the pathway
value of this grade). If we were to ignore the pathway value of grade 12, then on
average, Africans and Coloureds in our sample overestimate the returns to grade
12 (by about 48% and 16%, respectively), while Whites underestimate the returns
to grade 12 by about 8%. Taken together, these results illustrate the importance
of considering both option values and heterogeneity in returns to education when
considering information interventions.
Four possible interventions are defined and analysed in Section 2.5. We find
that the provision of information on outcomes unconditional on race or on a sub-
set of education pathways, would lead some youth to under-invest or over-invest in
education. In particular an intervention that takes into account option values but
ignores heterogeneity (mirroring Jensen (2010)) could increase the underestima-
tion of returns by Africans and Whites (from about 32% to 35% for Africans and
1We adopt the labels used in CAPS and by Seekings and Nattrass (2005) and
use the word ‘African’ to refer to peoples classified under apartheid as “native”,
“bantu” or “black”, the word ‘White’ to refer to people classified as European or
white, and the word ‘Coloured’ to refer to the people that don’t fit the first two
categories, including descendants of the indigenous Khoi and San, the descendants
of “Malay” slaves from Indonesia and those with mixed race ancestry.
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from about 0% to 18% for Whites), while leading to a substantial overestimation
of these returns among Coloureds (up from about 3% to 52%). We also find that,
independently of the issues of heterogeneity and option values, the ex ante analysis
of the effectiveness of information interventions is critically dependent on how ex-
pectations are updated. We find that unless the information is used to completely
replace all prior expectations, it may result in less accurate expectations, even if
the information provided accounts for heterogeneity in returns and option values.
Providing full information is not necessarily helpful. In addition, even if the infor-
mation provided is used to update all prior expectations, unless full information is
provided, it may not be helpful. The possibility of these results should be cause for
concern as they illustrate the need to explicitly consider the type of information
provided and the mechanisms through which youth may translate information into
decisions prior to conducting an intervention. In particular, consideration should
be given to the sequential nature of educational investments, heterogeneity in the
returns to education and the process of updating expectations.
In 2.6 we test the robustness of our results to changes in key assumptions
regarding the ROPE model and the data. For example, we consider the possibility
of there being heterogeneity in the returns to education according to gender rather
than race, and consider varying our assumptions about career length. In summary,
the results of all sensitivity checks are qualitatively the same as the original results.
This demonstrates that our conclusions about the dangers of information provision
are not simply due to a very specific combination of model and data assumptions.
Lastly, section 2.6 of this chapter concludes.
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2.2 Sequential investment in education and subjective ex-
pectations
2.2.1 Real options and sequential investment in education
Although important advances have been made in the analysis of the returns to
education (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) for a review of the literature),
several aspects of this decision have received much less attention. In particular,
investment in education has traditionally been modelled without much considera-
tion for the fact that such decisions are made in sequence and in consideration of a
range of possible outcomes. Every young person must make a series of sequential
decisions about education and employment based on their expectations regarding
costs and benefits of the available options. Keane and Wolpin (1997) use a dy-
namic human capital model with data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of
Labour Market experience and demonstrate that youths’ decisions are consistent
with this model of maximising behaviour that is based on sequential and periodic
consideration of the expected costs and benefits of school and work options (e.g.
school fees and lifetime earnings) over a career that lasts to the nominal age of 65.
However, as noted by Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006), the relevant expecta-
tions of youth may be inaccurate if youth do not have full information on costs and
benefits, potentially leading them to make sub-optimal decisions, a difficulty that
is shared by economists trying to understand these decisions in order to design
policies that may affect them (Manski, 1993).
The inclusion of uncertainty associated with the returns to each level of educa-
tion (for example, through the inclusion of the variance in the wages of graduates
that find jobs and/or the possibilities of unemployment or failure to complete a
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level of education) makes real options analysis an attractive approach to the mod-
elling of this decision. Weisbrod (1962) is one of the earliest explicit discussions of
the option value of different education levels as a way to overcome such limitations.
Using data from Schultz (1961), he concludes that existing estimates of returns to
education would be adjusted upward if they were to include the value of higher
education options, and that such adjustments could be substantial: for example,
the returns to primary school would be adjusted up from 35% to 53.9%.
Based on recent empirical work that considers the sequential nature of educa-
tion choices (Altonji, 1993, Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999,
Belzil, 2007, Pugatch, 2012, Lindset and Matsen, 2011), a broader concept of the
private value of education should consider the following components:
1. The expected net value of entering the labour market with a particular level of
education given current and expected labour market conditions, in particular
employment probability and the distribution of wages (for example, Levhari
and Weiss, 1974, Keane and Wolpin, 1997).
2. The value of learning about the individual’s academic ability and capacity
to successfully complete further education (for example, Altonji, 1993, Ar-
cidiacono, 2004, Stange, 2012).
3. The expected value of the options to invest in higher levels of education that
are opened by completing lower levels of education. For example, completing
grade 12 creates the option of enrolment in tertiary education (Weisbrod
(1962) and Lindset and Matsen (2011)).
Traditional measures of the returns to education do not deal with the uncer-
tainty regarding the first component and ignore the second and third components.
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Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) argue that for this reason, such estimates
most likely suffer from systematic downward bias. They argue, like Weisbrod
(1962), that the inclusion of an option value to years of education increases the
value of each year of education, which may be especially important for lower years
of education. Equally important seems to be the need to link the different compo-
nents listed above: for example, there has been little work linking uncertainty and
sequential investment in the analysis of educational choices (but see Eckstein and
Wolpin (1999) as an example of an exception). 2 Also, there is no research that
we are aware of that directly compares observed returns and subjectively expected
returns in a real options framework. In this chapter, the need for a real options
framework (and a sequential model) comes from the way information is linked to-
gether in such a framework, which may have implications for modelling the impact
of exogenous information shocks. Without using a sequential model, the impact
of an exogenous information shock (such as an information intervention) can only
be assessed in terms of (1), but not in terms of (3). For example, in order to
understand how the provision of information about university may impact on an
individual’s choice about grade 12, both (1) and (3) must be considered as they
are related to each other sequentially. If this were not the case and grade 12 was
not related to university entrance, information about the returns to university may
have no impact on choices about grade 12 completion. It is important to note that
learning about ability (2), or learning about the labour market (which could also
be included in a sequential model of education) are beyond the scope of this pa-
2Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006, p.6) conclude that their analysis of the
literature on uncertainty about the returns to education “points to a need for
more empirical studies that incorporate the sequential nature of individual school-
ing decisions and uncertainty about education costs and future earnings to help
determine their importance.”
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per though they remain areas that should be further researched. Next, we briefly
review the literature on expectations of returns to education, before providing a
link between a real options framework and subjective expectations in sections 2.3
and 2.4.
2.2.2 Subjective expectations of returns to education and
information interventions
As noted in the introduction, the usefulness of information interventions rests on
the hypothesis that education investment choices are made based on inaccurate
expectations of the benefits and/or costs of education. The general importance of
considering this possible divergence is highlighted by Manski (2004, pg.1360), who
notes that “researchers have many reasons to be interested in the correspondence
between subjective expectations and objective realities. Economists invoking ra-
tional expectations assumptions should want to know how well such assumptions
describe real decision makers.” The importance of this question in the context of
education choices was highlighted early by Manski (1993) and the answer has clear
policy implications: if it is evident that youth have inaccurate expectations about
returns to education, policies that provide information and assist youth with mak-
ing choices (such as careers counselling) might be appropriate, while if expectations
are accurate, policy makers should focus on other factors that may be leading to
inefficient levels of investment in education.
A general scepticism about the usefulness and reliability of subjective expecta-
tions data has meant that, until recently, there have been limited attempts at the
collection and analysis of this data (Manski, 2004, Delavande, Gine´, and McKenzie,
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2011, Attanasio, 2009). 3 The limited research on expectations of the returns to
schooling demonstrates that the accuracy of these expectations varies according to
country and level of education. Betts (1996) uses survey data of the income expec-
tations of students at the University of California San Diego to find that students
“made very good estimates of current salaries of young workers” (p.39), where stu-
dents average estimate of the wage differential between high school graduates and
college graduates is about 57.8% while Betts’ estimates the real differential to be
50.9%. Webbink and Hartog (2004) provide evidence from the Netherlands on the
correlation between students’ expected starting salaries (measured when they were
still enrolled in higher education) and what they were observed to earn four years
later and find that students have very accurate expectations. Another study, in the
USA by Rouse (2004) also finds students to have accurate income expectations.
Rouse used Dominitz and Manski’s (1996) data, from high income backgrounds,
and a small sample of low-income minority high school seniors in Baltimore city
to test the hypothesis that youth from low-income backgrounds have lower expec-
tations leading to lower levels of investment in education compared to youth from
high income backgrounds. The analysis shows that there is no significant difference
in expectations between the two groups of students, leading to the conclusion that
expectations cannot explain differences in rates of educational attainment.
As noted by Jensen (2010, p.516) youth in developing countries may have more
limited information on the returns to education available when compared to youth
in developed countries (where such information is more widely available). Indeed,
Jensen (2010) and Nguyen (2008), in the Dominican Republic and Madagascar,
3Dominitz and Manski (1996), is a notable early study that demonstrated that
students are willing and able to respond to earnings expectations questions in
probabilistic form (as opposed to responding just with averages/point estimates).
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respectively, find that students’ expectations are inaccurate. In the Dominican Re-
public, for example, there were no published estimates on the returns to education
available, nor was there the equivalent of a labour force survey that could be used
to estimate them. Given the lack of publicly available information, it is perhaps
not too surprising that youth in this context underestimate wages conditional on
the completion of secondary school by about 14% while also overestimating wages
conditional on primary school completion by 11% (both contributing to reduce the
expected net return to secondary school). Such deviations provide a justification
for interventions intended to influence education choices through the provision of
information. The conclusion of these two studies is that when students are informed
about average earnings conditional on different education outcomes they change
their expectations (reducing the large gap between students’ reported expecta-
tions and the information provided) and invest more in education: Nguyen (2008)
reports that, for those students with perceived returns lower than the average re-
turns (about which they were informed), school test scores improved significantly,
by 0.37 standard deviations, while Jensen (2010) reports an average increase in
number of years of schooling of 0.20-0.35 years for those students who receive in-
formation. Together, these results support the remaining two assumptions that
validate the potential utility of information interventions: students respond to the
provision of information by changing their expectations and, as a result (and when
feasible), invest in education. 4 In both cases, the information provided is very
4As noted in the introduction, in the Dominican Republic, changes in expecta-
tions were not followed by changes in education choices among the poorest youth.
Similarly (although not in the context of an information intervention), Attana-
sio and Kaufmann (2009) find, using data from Mexico, that expected returns to
schooling and perceived employment probabilities are related to school and college
attendance decisions in all but the poorer individuals. They hypothesise that this
is due to credit constraints faced by poor students that “break” the link between
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simple: average returns to different levels of education. This simplicity is justified
on the basis that it would be the easiest type of relevant information that the stu-
dents are likely to understand (Jensen, 2010, pg. 523). 5 However, in more or less
indirect ways, both Jensen (2010) and Nguyen (2008) address the two issues that
are central to this chapter, the importance of future options and of heterogeneity
in returns to education.
Focusing on the first issue, Jensen (2010) provides information on average earn-
ings conditional on all education options, rather than the simplistic approach of
providing information only on the next choice available to the beneficiaries of the
information intervention. Although this characteristic of this intervention is not
framed in terms of sequential nature of education choices, it implicitly raises the
option value of different grades, as they open the possibility of further studying. In
section 2.5 we explore the consequences of a more explicit treatment of the sequen-
tial nature of educational investment for the design of information interventions.
The importance of heterogeneity is addressed differently. For example, Nguyen
(2008) tested the relative effectiveness of role models who tell a personal success
story (either as substitute or complement to information on average returns to edu-
cation) and hypothesises that one explanation for their relative lack of effectiveness
expectations and behaviour.
5However, in cases where there is less concern about the capacity for youth
to analyse a wider range of information, interventions may be more complex. For
example, Kerr et al. (2013) evaluates a randomized field experiment of information
given to graduating high-school students about the returns to higher education in
Finland. Unlike other interventions, there was no need to limit information com-
plexity as in the interventions by Jensen (2010) and Nguyen (2008) and students
were given very specific and detailed information regarding employment probabil-
ities and mean wages according to individual degrees. The study found that such
information had an impact on the distribution of applications across higher edu-
cation courses, though it was too early to draw any conclusions about the welfare
implications of the intervention.
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would be that role models highlight the importance of aspects such as background
as determinants of returns to education. This effect was particularly pronounced
among poor children, who possibly assumed that success stories of students coming
from a wealthier background were not relevant to their own expected future (while
being positively influenced by role models who were from a poor background).
Given this, this analysis demonstrates that information can change expectations
and behaviour but that, importantly, heterogeneity in the returns to education
may matter for the design of information interventions.
Contrary to this position, the importance of heterogeneous returns to education
is clearly minimized in the design and analysis presented in Jensen (2010). The
reason for this neglect is presented as following:
“And although there is likely to be heterogeneity in the returns (say by school
quality or race) and students may be aware of that heterogeneity, this alone could
not explain why students on average have low expectations for the returns they
would personally face. (. . . ) black youths may believe the returns are lower for
them, but white youths should then also believe that the returns for them are higher
than average, so the average across a representative sample of youths should still
hit the correct average return.” (Jensen, 2010, p531, footnote 22)
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that heterogeneity in the returns
to education should neatly correspond to heterogeneity in expectations. That is,
for groups of youth for which the returns to education are high, their expectations
of the returns to education are also comparatively high (and vice versa). However,
it is possible that students who are advantaged in some way actually have lower
than average expectations and that students who are disadvantaged in some way
actually have higher than average expectations. If this were the case, it is not clear
25
ex ante that providing information on the returns to education would necessarily
increase the accuracy of expectations and lead to optimal investment in educa-
tion. In fact, it is possible that providing information on average returns could be
counterproductive in such a situation.
This point is best illustrated with a hypothetical example similar to that pre-
sented at the start of this chapter. Suppose that the returns to grade 12 and
university are on average (70, 180). However, there are heterogenous returns with
50% of students who are ‘advantaged’ facing returns of (90, 260), while the remain-
ing 50% are ‘disadvantaged’ and face returns of (50, 100). All of the ‘advantaged’
underestimate the returns to education for themselves by the same degree with ex-
pectations of (80, 200). In contrast, all of the ‘disadvantaged’ overestimate returns
to the same degree and have expectations of (55, 120). However, the ‘disadvan-
taged’ under-invest in education because of credit constraints. A researcher that
analysed this situation without explicitly measuring group differences, would see
average expectations to be (67.5, 160). The researcher would rightly conclude that
some youth underestimate the returns to education and they would be correct if
they assumed that some youth under-invest in education. However, if they pro-
vided information on the average returns to all youth (70, 180), this would lead to
an increase in the expectations for ‘disadvantaged’ students but have no effect on
investment because they are credit constrained. While simultaneously, this inter-
vention would lead to lower expectations for the ‘advantaged’ youth possibly low-
ering their investment in education (depending on education costs). Importantly,
unless heterogeneity was explicitly considered when designing the intervention, the
researcher would not be able to predict ex ante that this intervention would have a
0% chance of increasing the accuracy of expectations. Neither would it increase in-
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vestment in education (as it could only raise the expectations of the disadvantaged
who are credit constrained).
While this is a highly stylised example, the key point not recognised in Jensen
(2010) is that it is not sufficient to consider the average impact of an interven-
tion without considering heterogeneity in the observed and expected returns to
education across groups. 6. Also, if heterogeneity is significant, then a randomised
control trial would only give a consistent estimate of the effect of an intervention by
sub-group if it were randomised at that level and the information was appropriately
targeted. 7
Nguyen (2008, p.7-8) considers the relationship between the population average
of the return to education and its use by individuals when there is heterogeneity
in the returns. It is assumed that all individuals are aware of the relationship
between the population average and their own expected return (which is a linear
function of individual characteristics and the population average). This assump-
tion remains untested. It may be equally reasonable to assume that rather than
the national population average, individuals expected return should be modelled
based on the average return for a particular demographic group (for example, ac-
cording to gender, race, age, location etc.). Deciding on one particular statistic
on which individuals’ base their expectations (whether it is a national average,
local average, or average for a race group) is arbitrary but critically, it is by no
means innocuous. As the numerical example about heterogenous returns across
6Though the realistic possibility of disadvantaged/poor youth facing credit con-
straints and not being helped by information is something explicitly recognised by
Jensen (2010).
7Or if the idea of giving different information to different students seems unfair,
all students could be explicitly made aware of differences in the returns to education
due to demographic, individual or other factors and be provided with a range of
information on the returns to education conditional on these differences.
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groups demonstrates, making assumptions about the representativeness and ap-
propriateness of averages may lead to a misunderstanding of the likely impact of
an intervention and particularly, the possibility that the intervention might be
harmful.
Finally, one other problem with existing research on information interventions
is that they generally focus on increasing investment in education rather than in-
creasing the accuracy of expectations and the optimality of investment decisions.
This is important because if the market return to education is very low for some
students, increasing their level of investment in education may not be efficient.
Increasing investment per se should not be the goal of policy; rather, the goal
should be increasing the efficiency of choices (which would implicitly mean in-
creasing investment in education for those that currently invest less than what
they should). 8
2.3 Real Options Pathways for Education (ROPE): a model
of investment in education
This section presents a model of educational investment for those who have just
completed grade 11 and can either enrol in grade 12 or enter the labour market.
8While we only consider the private efficiency of choices and ignore the public
benefits of education, this should not be a problem for our analysis in sections 2.3
and 2.4 and our later assumption that both underinvestment and overinvestment
in education may be a problem. If it’s the case that the privately efficient level
of investment in education is less than the socially optimal level of investment in
education, attempting to mislead students into overvaluing the private benefits
of education so that they increase their investment is arguably not an ethical or
reliable solution to the problem. Rather, it could be argued that it would be better
for the government to consider ways of incentivising educational investment so that
the privately efficient investment level matches the socially efficient investment
level.
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We focus on a very stylized version of this decision, in order to present the main
differences that originate from the consideration of the sequential decision of this
investment and postpone the consideration of the specificities of the South African
context, in particular regarding its education system and labour market, until the
next section. We will refer to this model as Real Options Pathways for Education
(ROPE), as it emphasises the fact that investment in grade 12 can be made in
consideration of the options for higher education that open upon its completion.
The purpose of ROPE is to provide a framework in which the impact of in-
formation interventions may be considered. Specifically, information on monthly
earnings conditional on different levels of education, provided to individuals that
have just finished grade 11. Frameworks similar to ROPE have been suggested
as tools to assist decision making in other contexts. For example, Hertzler (2007)
presents a series of “decision diagrams” that may be used by farmers when making
production decisions in the face of new risks stemming from climate change. Also
of relevance is the use of diagrams in support of the sequential educational choice
model of Breen and Goldthorpe (1997). They investigate differences in educa-
tional attainments according to class and gender as a function of the existence of
heterogeneity in access to resources for educational investment according to class
(that impact on educational choice through the rational evaluation of costs and
benefits).
The complete decision problem of the individual and all the possible outcomes
are linked together in this diagram (figure 2.1), which includes the probabilities
of pass and failure for grade 12 and higher education (here, labeled as grade 13).
Decisions are represented as solid lines while dotted lines indicate events (passing
or failure of a grade) with the probabilities of these events specified within brackets.
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Figure 2.1: Real Options Pathways for Education (ROPE)
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The boxes, numbered 2-6, correspond to possible final outcomes.
At the start of each time period, individuals can choose whether to continue in
school or to join the labour market. We assume that once they enter the labour
market they do not return to education and when in education they can only
decide to leave or continue to the next level at the start of the next time period.
The outcome of a year of education is binary, with pass/fail as possible outcomes.
We further assume that utility is a linear function of income only and that agents
are risk neutral. 9 The model can be solved recursively to arrive at the income
maximising choice between investing in grade 12 and leaving school after grade 11.
At the start of the first time period (that is, having completed grade 11),
individuals maximise expected lifetime utility by deciding to either continue in
school (for which they expect utility of E(U12)), or to enter the labour market
(for which they expect utility of E(UL)).
E (U) = Max { E (UL) , E (U12)} (2.1)
Expected utility for one year in the labour market would be a function of the
full time employment probability (EP 11) and expected wage conditional on the
completion of grade 11 (W 11). Expected lifetime utility from entry into the labour
market is given in equation 2.2 as a function of the discounted sum of expected
labour market returns for duration of her/his career, given by the difference be-
tween the minimum of retirement age and life expectancy (y) and the age at which
they complete grade 11 (a). Subscript t denotes the age of the individual in each
9We assume risk neutrality for simplicity but it is important to note that risk
neutrality is not synonymous with risk being unimportant. For example, Hogan
and Walker (2007) find that risk affects educational investment independently of
the degree of risk aversion.
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year of their work career from the time they leave school. R is the discount rate
and g is an expected constant growth rate in wages. 10
E (UL2) =
( y∑
t=a
EP 11t ×W11t × (1 + g)
y−a
(1 +R)y−a
)
(2.2)
Expected utility from continuing onto grade 12 depends on different possibili-
ties. Firstly it depends on the expected wage and employment probability if grade
12 is failed, (which occurs with probability (1 − α12)). We assume that this ex-
pected wage and employment probability are the same as for entering the labour
market with grade 11 ( W11 and EP 11 , respectively). Expected utility from this
outcome is expressed in equation 2.3, which differs from equation 2.2 because it
includes the direct cost of grade 12 (C12) and the opportunity cost associated with
one extra year of education (as the sum of wages is now between a+1 and y).
E (UL3) =
 y∑
t=a+1
EP 11t ×W11t × (1 + g)
y−a−1
(1 +R)y−a−1
− C12 (2.3)
Those who successfully complete grade 12 (with probability α12 ) can opt be-
tween entering the labour market with a different expected wage and employment
probability (W12 and EP 12, respectively), as expressed in equation 2.4.
E (UL4) =
 y∑
t=a+1
EP 12t ×W12t × (1 + g)
y−a−1
(1 +R)y−a−1
− C12 (2.4)
10For simplicity, we assume that the growth rate in wages is equal and constant
for all levels of education and is equal in magnitude to the discount rate. Extensions
to the model could easily incorporate both a discount rate and a growth rate in
wages that vary. Also, when considering the presentation of data to youth we
assume that nominal mean monthly earnings would be provided to youth and that
they would use this information to infer total career earnings for each educational
pathway. While youth may not think exactly in correspondence with ROPE, it is
designed to be an approximation of the sequential choice framework they would
use.
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or, alternatively, can invest in higher education. For simplicity we assume that
there is only one higher education option, that lasts one year. This option has a
direct cost of C13 and is associated with W13 and EP 13 as the expected wage and
expected employment probability, respectively. Two outcomes are then possible, as
the student may fail higher education (with probability (1−α13)) or, alternatively,
pass. Equations 2.5 and 2.6 represent the lifetime earnings associated with each
of these outcomes, respectively.
E (UL5) =
 y∑
t=a+2
EP 12t ×W12t × (1 +G)
y−a−2
(1 +R)y−a−2
− (C12 + C13(1 +R)2 ) (2.5)
E (UL6) =
 y∑
t=a+2
EP 13t ×W13t × (1 +G)
y−a−2
(1 +R)y−a−2
− (C12 + C13(1 +R)2 ) (2.6)
Youth will choose an educational investment pathway with the greatest ex-
pected return. Clearly, no matter how low the cost of grade 12 is, or high the
return to grade 12 is (and the higher education option), as long as there is the pos-
sibility of failing grade 12, there is the possibility of a lower utility outcome than if
the individual entered the labour market immediately following grade 11. 11 That
is, the following condition will always hold: E(UL3) < E(UL2).
Also of significance is the inclusion of the option value of tertiary education if the
individual finishes grade 12 successfully which can be separated from its direct
value. Equation 2.7 expresses the direct net value of grade 12, ED (a net value
because it is the added value of grade 12 compared to grade 11), while equation
2.10 expresses the option value, EO, (the pathway value). Equation 2.16 expresses
the total value of grade 12, ET which is equal to ED + EO.
11This result reflects the existence of opportunity costs of education and it holds
even if the direct costs of education C12, are zero.
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ED = (1− α12)× E (UL3) + α12 × E (UL4)− E (UL2) (2.7)
EO = [α12×Max {E (UL4) , (1− α13)× E (UL5) + α13 × E (UL6)}]−[α12×E (UL4)]
(2.8)
ET = (1− α12)× E (UL3) + α12×
Max {E (UL4) , (1− α13)× E (UL5) + α13 × E (UL6)} − E (UL2) (2.9)
As noted by Weisbrod (1962) and Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006), esti-
mates of returns to grade 12 obtained through a model without option values would
be downward biased. In addition, as we will address in more detail in section 5, an
information intervention that only provides information on outcomes 2-4, would
not be enough to decide on the optimal investment decision, unless one is willing
to assume that individuals were perfectly informed about outcomes 5-6. If this
assumption were incorrect, then no matter how effective the intervention was in
correcting expectations in 2-4, individuals may still not make the utility maximis-
ing investment decision following the intervention. In short, the consideration of
the sequential nature of educational choices requires the provision of information
on all possible educational outcomes.
In addition it is clear that providing information only on expected earnings,
will impact individuals’ decisions differentially, depending on their probabilities of
passing different levels of education and also on employment probabilities (even if
information is provided on earnings conditional on all possible levels of education).
For example, someone who is 100% certain that they would fail grade 12 would
not be influenced by information on earnings conditional on grade 12 or the higher
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education option. Finally, nothing has been said so far about the nature of these
different quantities used to model this decision other than that they are conditional
on different educational levels. In particular, we have not yet taken into account
the possibility of other wage determinants, and said nothing about the nature of
the probabilities used to guide decisions through the different levels of education.
In the next section we take these steps, using data from South Africa.
2.4 Using ROPE in the South African context
The decision model presented in figure 2.1 was deliberately simplified to highlight
the main elements of a model that incorporates the sequential nature of educational
investments. However, its use in an analysis of the possible effects of information
campaigns on such decisions requires a more realistic description of the decision
tree facing individuals and information on expected labour market outcomes. In
this section we specify the model for the education system and labour market of
South Africa.
There are three important features of the South African context that make it
especially interesting. Firstly, given the high level of income inequality (Leibbrandt
and Woolard, 2001) and youth unemployment (Kingdon and Knight, 2007, 2004)
in South Africa, it is not surprising that the economic returns to education are a
central motivation in education choices (Cosser and du Toit, 2002). In addition
to education being valued for its association with higher earnings, higher levels of
education are also valued because they are associated with increased probability of
employment (Branson et al., 2012). Secondly, there is a pronounced convexity in
the return structure to education (Keswell and Poswell, 2004). Using data from a
national household living standards survey in 1993, Mwabu and Schultz (2000) find
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that for all races, the earnings premiums for higher education are greater than the
they are for secondary education and primary education. This pattern of returns
suggests that the option values of higher education may be especially important
to the decision to invest in grade 12.
Lastly, there are pronounced differences across racial groups in both educational
achievement and average earnings, with Whites earning more (and being more
educated) than Coloureds who in turn earn more (and are more educated) than
Africans (Keswell and Poswell, 2004). In addition, there are differences in the
returns to education between races. Interestingly however, while Whites earn more
than other races for any given level of education, there is evidence that from the
last years of apartheid until now, ex post relative returns to secondary and higher
education have been consistently greatest for Africans. For example, Mwabu and
Schultz (2000, p22) estimate that tertiary education earnings premiums for African
men and women were 29% and 40% per year, respectively, while they were 15%
and 14% per year for Whites and about 19% and 30% for Coloureds. Similarly,
Branson et al. (2012, p8) using annual data from the Labour Force Survey, estimate
that in 2007, African men with two years of post-secondary schooling were earning
70% more than African men with only grade 12 completion. But despite the
relatively high tertiary education earnings premiums, the proportion of individuals
completing tertiary education has not dramatically increased across generations.
For example, Branson et al. (2012, p21) estimate that 10.2% of males born in 1953-
1955 have a tertiary qualification while 9.8% of males born in 1983-1985 have a
tertiary qualification. There are several possibilities for why this might be the case.
Two are of particular interest in this chapter. Firstly, youth may underestimate
the very high rates of return to tertiary education. Secondly, even if youth are
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aware of the earnings premiums, tertiary education may be difficult to enter and
to complete. The ex ante expected return to tertiary education for a grade 11
student must account for the possibility of failure to pass in grade 12 and failure
to pass in tertiary study.
One characteristic of South Africa’s higher education system that is particularly
relevant to this discussion is the wide range of options accessible to youth once
they complete high school. Students can enrol in one year diplomas or technical
certificates, two year diplomas or technical certificates and undergraduate degrees
(three or four years in length).12 The choice between these different degrees is
dependent on the individual’s results at the end of grade 12. Those enrolling in
grade 12 may “pass with exemption”, “pass without exemption” or fail. Passing
with exemption is required for some higher education options, namely three and
four year university degrees, but it is not required for the lower levels of higher
education.
For each year of study in higher education, there is a chance of failure. For
simplicity we assume that if the student fails a year s/he enters the labour market
in the following year. We will also assume that incomplete education (such as
passing the first year of a bachelor degree but failing its second year) has no effect
on expected wages and employment probability, which are then assumed to be
identical to the highest concluded degree: for example, a youth with incomplete
higher education will expect to receive the wage that he would have received had
12There are also postgraduate degrees, such as masters degrees. However, we
ignore this possibility as we have no information on such degrees in the data we
use. No individuals in our sample are recorded as having completed more than 4
years of post-high school education. Also, we do not distinguish between different
courses and subject areas within higher educational categories (for example, we do
not distinguish between a 3 year bachelor of arts degree and a 3 year bachelor of
science degree).
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s/he entered the labour market after completing year 12.
To specify the ROPE model for South Africa, we need information about pass
probabilities, employment probabilities and average wage levels conditional on dif-
ferent levels of education. We use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)
which is a longitudinal study of a random sample of 4758 youth aged 14-22 in 2002
living in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area. 13 The study focuses on a wide range
of important outcomes for youth during the transition to adulthood, including
schooling and labour market participation. All youth were initially interviewed in
2002 (wave 1) and then in 2003-2004 (wave 2), 2005 (wave 3) and 2006 (wave 4).
Importantly for our discussion of the potential impact of information campaigns,
respondents were asked about their subjective expectations of wages, through the
question “What is the typical take-home monthly wage for other people like you
(same age, education, and skills) who have full-time jobs?”. We restrict our anal-
ysis to wave 3, as this is the only wave for which this question was asked of the
whole sample. One limitation of the data is that each individual was only asked
for expectations regarding their own level of education. I assume however, that
conditional on race and education, individuals are the same in all other regards.
Later, in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.1 we consider the possible importance of gender and
self-selection into employment. Another limitation of the data is that the sample
is not representative of youth around South Africa. This is particularly in regards
13The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3 were collected between 2002 and
2005 by the University of Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding
provided by the US National Institute for Child Health and Human Development
and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wave 4 was collected in 2006 by the
University of Cape Town, University of Michigan and Princeton University. Major
funding for Wave 4 was provided by the National Institute on Ageing through a
grant to Princeton University, in addition to funding provided by NICHD through
the University of Michigan. See Lam, Seekings, and Sparks (2008).
38
to proportions of each race in the sample. While Coloureds are the largest group in
the sample this is only because they are over-represented in Western Cape province
compared to the rest of the country and CAPS was designed to be representative
of that province.
Table 2.1 presents some summary statistics for observed and expected earnings,
by education level and race. We consider only youth aged 17-25 (which represents
98% of the respondents in wave 3 of CAPS) because focusing on this age range
ensures that all respondents are old enough to have finished grade 11 and that some
are old enough to have completed a 4 year degree. For the subjective expectations
data, we include both employed and unemployed youth, and both youth that are
still in school and those that have left school. To make it comparable with the
subjective expected wage, we restrict the analysis of observed earnings to full-time
workers, who represent 78% of those who worked any number of hours. 14 Earnings
data in CAPS was reported as monthly net wages measured in Rands, which we
simply multiply by 12 to estimate expected yearly earnings. 15
Table 2.2 presents the probability of the two events we consider, namely finding
14There is no official definition of full-time work in South Africa, nor is full-time
a term that is defined explicitly in CAPS. We define a full-time worker as someone
who works 140 hours a month or more, corresponding to working 7hrs a day, 5
days a week. We also compute the rate of “not employed full-time”, rather than a
more conventional unemployment rate.
15It should be noted that the number of observations for Africans with 3 years
of higher education that are working is zero. However, unless the pathway for 3
years of higher education were in reality more valuable for these youths than the
pathway for 4 years of higher education (and this seems unlikely as for Whites
and Coloureds it is not), this is inconsequential to our estimates of the net value
of grade 12 in the ROPE framework. A more critical limitation of the version of
ROPE we specify for South Africa is that we ignore all direct costs of education.
As the direct costs of university education are substantial in South Africa, many
youth may not be able to afford to go to university and so may not consider the
university pathways when valuing grade 12. This issue is addressed later in the
paper, in section 2.6.4.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: observed and expected monthly earnings in Rands
Observed Expected Over-
Grade Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD estimation
All races
11 82 1756 780 315 2217 1553 26.3%
12 395 2793 1966 670 3328 2062 19.2%
13 21 3160 2242 36 3383 1363 7.1%
14 11 3092 1786 33 5061 3440 63.7%
15 10 4408 3153 68 5175 3000 17.4%
16 9 11611 9955 16 10564 8330 -9.0%
African
11 40 1469 709 186 2133 1459 45.2%
12 105 2076 2050 271 3082 2134 48.5%
13 2 5250 6010 11 3836 1614 -26.9%
14 2 3300 424 15 5647 3999 71.1%
15 0 0 0 15 5520 3309 0.0%
16 2 10000 7071 4 9875 7554 -1.3%
Coloured
11 38 1977 748 103 2369 1750 19.8%
12 242 2713 1331 332 3140 1829 15.7%
13 15 3057 1897 17 2947 993 -3.6%
14 5 2500 1127 12 3858 2915 54.3%
15 6 4097 4083 23 4839 3138 18.1%
16 2 6000 1414 4 6506 5793 8.4%
White
11 4 2525 709 26 2219 1378 -12.1%
12 52 4613 2954 67 4261 2549 -7.6%
13 4 2500 1061 8 3688 1557 47.5%
14 5 3600 2584 6 6000 2588 66.7%
15 4 4875 1250 30 5260 2806 7.9%
16 5 14500 12560 8 12938 9682 -10.8%
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Table 2.2: Event probabilities
All African Coloured White
Obs % Obs % Obs % Obs %
Grade 12, fail 259 23.2% 119 37.0% 98 15.3% 42 2.4%
Grade 12, pass, no exempt. 325 54.8% 134 52.7% 126 65.9% 65 33.0%
Grade 12, pass, with exempt. 325 22.0% 134 10.3% 126 18.8% 65 64.6%
Tertiary, pass 379 88.7% 111 77.5% 155 93.6% 113 92.9%
Employ. prob. grade 11 227 40.5% 129 32.6% 91 50.6% 7 57.1%
Employ. prob. grade 12 889 53.0% 299 39.1% 477 61.2% 113 54.5%
Employ. prob. grade 13 46 60.9% 7 42.9% 28 71.4% 11 45.5%
Employ. prob. grade 14 26 57.7% 9 33.3% 11 63.6% 6 83.3%
Employ. prob. grade 15 29 41.4% 3 0.0% 10 70.0% 16 31.3%
Employ. prob. grade 16 12 75.0% 3 66.7% 4 50.0% 5 100.0%
a job (employment probabilities) and successfully completing a grade (passing
probabilities). The full-time employment rate was calculated as those employed
full-time divided by the total number of youth who are not studying. We do
not use a traditional definition of unemployment as there is evidence in South
Africa of a large number of discouraged workers (Kingdon and Knight, 2000). Pass
probabilities for each educational level were calculated using data on the proportion
of students in grade 12 and in tertiary education that successfully completed their
level. For example for grade 12, the pass probability is the proportion of those
students who had been enrolled in grade 12 in the previous year and that had
reported grade 12 as having being completed in the current year. Strictly speaking,
the pass probability is a ’completion probability’ as it counts those students that
drop out as students that ’fail’. The probability of students who pass grade 12 with
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exemption was taken from a CAPS question that specifically asks students in wave
3 if they have such an exemption or not. However, we cannot distinguish between
pass rates for different years of tertiary education and are forced to assume that
the average pass rate is the same for all years of tertiary education and for all types
of tertiary education. Finally, we assume that youth are aged 17 in year 1 and that
life expectancy at birth is 56.3 (the life expectancy in the year 2000, the year of the
national census). 16 This information will allow us to estimate expected benefits
for all the different possibilities in an expanded version of the ROPE model. 17
The summary statistics presented in table 2.1 reflect what is known regarding
the structure of returns to education in South Africa. Wages for those who finished
grade 12 are significantly greater than for those who only completed grade 11,
less than the wages earned by those with 1-3 years of tertiary education, and
significantly smaller than for a 4 year degree. Also, while wages for African youth
16As this assumption about the length of career corresponding neatly to life
expectancy is arbitrary, we consider changes to this assumption in a sensitivity
analysis presented in section 2.6.3. While life expectancy may differ sharply by
race in South Africa, we use the non-conditional life expectancy as there are no
official statistics on life expectancy by race. Also, as reported in section 2.6.3,
changing the life expectancy makes no difference to the results.
17One potential problem with our sample regards self-selection of those who are
not working, as they may have different ability, preferences and expectations from
those who are working. We address this issue in section 2.6.2 and find that restrict-
ing the sample to only those that are employed has no substantial consequence for
the results and conclusions. Another possible issue regards self-selection of those
with different levels of education. Expectations of earnings for each grade are
measured only for individuals with that level of education. This could be impor-
tant if individuals with different ability levels invest differently in education (for
example, they may have different expected and actual pass rates). For simplicity
we assume that the only cause of heterogeneity in expectations and observed re-
turns other than grade of education completed is race. However, in section 2.6.1
we consider the alternative assumption that gender drives heterogeneity and find
that our conclusions are unaffected by this changed assumption about the source
of heterogeneity.
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that finish a 4 year degree are lower than for White youth (R10000 versus R14500),
the percentage wage premium for a 4 year degree relative to grade 12 is higher for
African youth than it is for White youth (481% versus 314%). In addition, and
as shown in table 2.2, higher levels of education are also associated with higher
probabilities of working full time.
Comparing expected and actual earnings for each race group in table 2.1, it
is possible to conclude that, conditional on race, we find both cases of average
overestimation and average underestimation of returns to education: for example,
Coloured youth with grade 12 overestimate the returns to this grade by 16% while
Coloured youth with 13 years of education underestimate the returns to this level
by 4%. Across all race groups and grades, average overestimation ranges from
-27% to 71% and this combination of of overestimation and underestimation for
each race group makes it a priori unclear whether the overall net value of grade
12 in a ROPE model would be an overestimate or underestimate. Also, the large
range in magnitude of overestimation and underestimation may be due in part
to small sample sizes for observed wages and expected wages for some levels of
education. For example, while overestimation of 14 years of education for Africans
is measured to be 71%, this may be because the two African individuals that are
working with this level of education just happen to be earning less than average.
While the accuracy of the estimates may be a problem because of small samples,
we do not have reason to believe that the estimates are biased. It is also important
to note that an information intervention that addresses inaccuracy in expectations
for only some levels of education might leave inaccuracy in the expectations of
other levels of education unchanged.
It might be argued that the relationship between earnings and education would
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be made clearer by OLS or IV estimation. However, this chapter does not use
econometric estimates of the returns to education in the ROPE framework for a
simple reason- we want to consider information interventions that could be easily
communicated to youth with little or no training in econometrics. While average
earnings conditional on education could be communicated to youth in high-school,
there would be no easy way of communicating OLS or IV estimates without gross
simplification (which may make the information misleading). Hence, we follow
the precedent set by Jensen (2010) and consider average observed earnings as the
information that is communicated to youth.
Figure 2.2 summarises the pathways available to students in South Africa,
under the assumptions discussed and using the probabilities and wage estimates
presented in tables 2.2 and 2.2, with estimated expected lifetime earnings reported
in Rands. Each year after the completion of grade 11 is characterized by a choice
to join the labour market (work) or to invest in another year of education. The
first column for each year constitutes the set of possible choices for that year,
conditional on the outcome of the previous year, with the links being indicated
by arrows. If the last year was a period of study that was either failed or was
the final year of a degree being passed, the individual would choose to enter the
labour market in the proceeding year. If the the previous year was grade 12 or in a
non-terminal year of a degree, the individual can continue studying in the following
year or can enter the labour market. The outcomes of years where the individual
enters the labour market are specified by an expected lifetime earnings equation,
with the general form specified in equation 2.10 and where s is the number of years
spent in education since grade 11, x is the highest grade completed and g = R.
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E (ULx) =
( y∑
t=a+s
EP xt ×Wxt × (1 + g)
y−a+s
(1 +R)y−a+s
)
(2.10)
While there are many pathways the model can easily be solved recursively to
arrive at values for the overall expected returns to grade 11 and grade 12.The
numbers presented in figure 2.2 are based on actual earnings unconditional on
race and while not presented, the same model is also specified for each race group
individually and for expected earnings rather than observed earnings (for a total of
8 specifications). As an example of how the values of the outcomes were calculated,
consider the number representing the lifetime earnings that should objectively be
expected if an individual passes a 4 year degree and enters the labour market
(R3 584 350, presented at the bottom right corner of figure 2.2). Using equation
2.10, and the data from tables 2.2 and 2.2 for mean annual wage (116111 × 12),
employment probability (0.75) and with a career length of life expectancy (56.3)
minus age at degree completion (22), yields 2.11:
E(UL16) = R11611× 12× 0.75× (56.3− 22) = 3584350 (2.11)
To find the optimal pathway from grade 11 completion onward, an individual
would solve the general ROPE equation 2.11, where the return to grade 12 is
expanded to equation 2.12:
E(U12) = 0.23× E(UL11)
+0.55×Max{E(UL11), T1, T2}+ 0.22×Max{E(UL11), T1, T2, T3, T4} (2.12)
In this equation, T1-T4 represent the returns to each level of tertiary education.
T1-T3 are presented in equations 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15, respectively. While T4 is
not explicitly presented in the interests of space, it follows the exact same pattern
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Figure 2.2: ROPE Specified for the South African Context
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as T3, except with four points where the individual considers the maximum of
either entering the labour market or continuing to study.
T1 = 0.11× E(UL12) + 0.89× E(UL13) (2.13)
T2 = 0.11×E(UL12) + 0.89×Max{E(UL12), 0.11×E(UL12) + 0.89×E(UL14)}
(2.14)
T3 = 0.11× E(UL12) + 0.89×Max[E(UL12), 0.11× E(UL12)+
0.89×Max〈E(UL12), 0.11× E(UL12)+
0.89×Max{{E(UL12), 0.11× E(UL12) + 0.89× E(UL14)}〉]
(2.15)
Table 2.3 presents, for the whole sample and then for each race group, the
values for the return to grades 11 and 12 estimated in the ROPE framework using
observed and expected wages. The values for observed wages come from the full-
time working sample for each race, while the sample used for expected wages
includes both those who are working and those who are not working (the samples
in table 2.1). The grade 11 total value is the value of entering the labour market
with grade 11. The grade 12 total value is composed of the value of entering the
labour market with grade 12 (grade 12 direct value) plus the value of creating the
option of enrolling in higher education (grade 12 pathway value). The equations
used to calculate these values are the same as equations 2.7, 2.10, and 2.10, except
they are expanded to include the greater number of options in the South African
context. This pathway value is also presented as a percentage of the total value
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of grade 12 (which is equal to pathway value divided by the total value). The last
row of table 2.3 presents the difference between the total values of grade 11 and
grade 12 (grade 12 total net value), which we assume is the criterion used in the
investment decision rule. Finally, for each race and grade, we compare observed
and expected values through the calculation of an overestimation percentage.
Table 2.3: Returns to grade 12 in the ROPE framework
Observed Expected Overestimation
All races
Grade 11 total value 335637 423844 26.3%
Grade 12 direct value 598260 718377 20.1%
Grade 12 pathway value 477701 523780 9.6%
Grade 12 total value 1075960 1242156 15.4%
Pathway value (%) 44.4 42.2 -5.0%
Grade 12 net value 740323 818312 10.5%
African
Grade 11 total value 225573 327580 45.2%
Grade 12 direct value 316559 467373 47.6%
Grade 12 pathway value 344587 157908 -54.2%
Grade 12 total value 661145 625280 -5.4%
Pathway value (%) 52.1 25.3 -51.5%
Grade 12 net value 435572 297701 -31.7%
Coloured
Grade 11 total value 471330 564739 19.8%
Grade 12 direct value 716745 832383 16.1%
Grade 12 pathway value 199284 187977 -5.7%
Grade 12 total value 916029 1020360 11.4%
Pathway value (%) 21.8 18.4 -15.3%
Grade 12 net value 444699 455622 2.5%
White
Grade 11 total value 680417 598021 -12.1%
Grade 12 direct value 1142814 1054864 -7.7%
Grade 12 pathway value 2346794 2354386 0.3%
Grade 12 total value 3489609 3409250 -2.3%
Pathway value (%) 67.3 69.1 2.7%
Grade 12 net value 2809191 2811229 0.1%
The results in table 2.3 show that there is considerable variation in returns
to education along race lines, as expected. The pattern from highest to lowest
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returns is from White, to Coloured to African and this is true both for expected
and observed net returns. The investment decision for grade 12 is made based on
the total net returns of grade 12. Based on this criterion, the average individual
should want to invest in grade 12 regardless of their race or gender, as long as the
costs of education are lower than this return. 18
This conclusion holds even after decomposing the total value of grade 12 to
its direct and pathway values, which are R598 260 and R477 701, respectively.
The pathway value corresponds to 44% of the total value and increases the dif-
ference between the returns to grade 11 and grade 12. With no tertiary options
considered, grade 12 would be worth R262 623 more than grade 11. However,
including the pathway value means that grade 12 is worth R740 323 more than
grade 11. Similarly, the expected net return to grade 12 is always positive (table
2.3), though for African youth it is underestimated by about 32%. This is because
they underestimate the pathway value of grade 12. If we were to only consider
expectations regarding the direct value, we would not have reason to fear that
African youth might under-invest in education. This is because African youth
overestimate the direct return to grade 12 by 47.6%. These results suggest two
conclusions. The first is that the pathway value of grade 12 is always important
and information campaigns that neglect the sequential dimension of educational
18If race is ignored and all the data is pooled together to estimate the net return
to grade 12 in the ROPE framework, overestimation percentage is estimated to be
10.5%. This may seem peculiar given that overestimation percentage is lower for
each race individually but it is important to understand that ROPE estimates for
all are not just a weighted average of the ROPE estimates by race. The observed
and expected mean earnings for each level of education by race do indeed form
weighted averages that are inputs into the ROPE model for all. However, the
model is not a simple linear combination of these inputs and so there is no reason
why the net value of grade 12 should correspond to what it is for the ROPE model
by race.
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decisions risks undervaluing education. The second is that overall, while White
and Coloured youth in our sample seem to have fairly accurate expectations of the
net return to grade 12, there may still be motivation for an information interven-
tion to reduce underestimation (and presumably under investment in education)
among African youth. In the next section we will consider different approaches to
information interventions and the possible consequences of these approaches.
2.5 Using ROPE to evaluate the potential impacts of in-
formation interventions
In this section we consider the impact of returns to education of four information
interventions that might possibly be considered, ex ante, as ways of improving the
accuracy of expectations and, potentially, improving education investment choices.
All four interventions involve the provision of mean monthly earnings conditional
on years of education completed. Also, we only consider information interventions
that would occur at the end of grade 11, when youth need to make a choice about
whether to stay in school or enter the labour market. 19 The first intervention we
consider consists of the provision of information on mean monthly wage in a full
time job, conditional on completion of grade 11 and on completion of grade 12. We
label it the “simple intervention” as it does not take into account heterogeneity in
the returns to education or the pathway value of grade 12. The second intervention
we consider consists in the provision of information on mean monthly wages in a
full time job to all higher education options in addition to the information included
19It must be emphasised that the four interventions proposed are meant to be
fairly simple interventions that correspond to the designs of previous real-world
interventions. That does not imply that any of these interventions are ideal, only
that they are all practical.”
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in the “simple intervention”. However, we still do not consider the possibility of
heterogeneous returns to education. Because its structure parallels the interven-
tion used by Jensen (2010), we label it the “standard intervention”. Thirdly, we
consider a “targeted intervention” which, like the “simple intervention”, provides
information only on wages conditional on completion of grade 11 and grade 12
but takes into account possible differences across races. Lastly, we consider the
“full intervention”, that provides youth with information on average wage in a
full time job for all grades (including higher education) conditional on race. This
intervention combines consideration of the full range of education options (as in
the standard intervention) with consideration of heterogeneity (as in the targeted
intervention). The information provided in each intervention by race is reported
in table 2.4. As can be seen here however, the information given in the simple
and standard interventions is the same for all races as these interventions do not
provide mean earnings conditional on race. 20
We are interested in evaluating these interventions in terms of whether they
improve the accuracy of subjective expectations. The criterion we use does not
20It should be noted that is not totally clear from the question eliciting expecta-
tions in CAPS if participants specifically reported a mean expected wage, though
we assume that they did (as they were asked to report a ‘typical take-home monthly
wage’). It is possible though, that instead of a mean wage participants reported
a median wage. For this reason, we also tested the provision of median earnings
rather than mean earnings for all interventions. There was no qualitative difference
to the results except in one case of the full intervention (when there is no perfect
updating of expectations). However, for the proceeding analysis we use only the
mean rather than the median for two key reasons. Firstly, expected earnings in the
ROPE model are based on mean earnings, not median earnings, with the assump-
tion that youth are risk neutral so they would have no reason to care about the
median. Secondly, we assume that all youth by grade 11 understand the concept
of an average monthly wage but may not be familiar with the concept of a median
wage. Any provision of such information would need to be accompanied by an
explanation of what a median wage is.
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Table 2.4: Contents of information interventions
Grade 11 Grade 12 1yr dip. 2yr dip. 3yr degree 4yr degree
Simple intervention
African R1756 R2793
Coloured R1756 R2793
White R1756 R2793
Standard intervention
African R1756 R2793 R3160 R3092 R4408 R11611
Coloured R1756 R2793 R3160 R3092 R4408 R11611
White R1756 R2793 R3160 R3092 R4408 R11611
Targeted intervention
African R2133 R3082
Coloured R2369 R3140
White R2219 R4261
Full intervention
African R2133 R3082 R3836 R5647 R5520 R9875
Coloured R2369 R3140 R2947 R3858 R4839 R6506
White R2219 R4261 R3688 R6000 R5260 R12938
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specify anything about the magnitude of the change in expectations, only the
direction. We define an improvement in the accuracy of expectations (and hence
intervention success) as when the following criteria are met21:
1. That the average overestimation of the net value of grade 12 for groups that
overestimate this value is reduced following the intervention and is equal to
or greater than zero following the intervention. That is, average overestima-
tion does not become underestimation. For example, if a group had a 2%
overestimation before the intervention but a 2% underestimation following
the intervention, this criterion would not be met.
2. That the average underestimation of the net value of grade 12 for groups that
underestimate this value is reduced following the intervention and is equal to
or less than zero following the intervention. That is, average underestimation
does not become average overestimation.
3. For groups that do not underestimate or overestimate the net value of grade
12, following an intervention they should not underestimate or overestimate
the net value of grade 12.
Because our goal is to consider information that could be explained to youth at
the end of high school, we need to make some assumptions regarding the types of
21As we cannot directly measure the efficiency of decisions without information
on costs, we cannot know how many agents will change their decisions following an
intervention, regardless of whether or not it meets the criteria we specify. However,
if an intervention were to meet the criteria we specify and there is no variance in
expectations within groups, then that intervention would be a Pareto improvement:
It would potentially make some groups better off without making any groups worse
off. If our criteria are not met by an intervention, there would be no easy way of
establishing Pareto efficiency ex ante.
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information that can be easily provided and understood. In particular, we assume
that:
1. Youth can understand mean earnings conditional on demographic character-
istics, that is, they should understand what is meant by a statement such as
“the average monthly earnings for a white person with a university degree”;
2. They can understand conditional probabilistic outcomes, such as the meaning
of the probability of finding a job conditional on having finished grade 12,
versus the probability of finding a job if they were to leave school after
grade 11;
3. They use the information provided in a rational and predictable way that
mirrors the way information is used in the ROPE model;
4. The different event probabilities are known to youth. (As there is no quanti-
tative data on subjective expectations regarding event probabilities, it would
not be possible to test otherwise, using the data we have.)
With the possible exception of assumption 4, these assumptions seem relatively
weak. They are supported by a growing literature, discussed in section 2.2 and
reviewed by Delavande, Gine´, and McKenzie (2011), that finds that people in de-
veloping countries can generally understand and answer probabilistic questions. In
addition, the seemingly sensible responses to expectations questions in the data
we use (for example, the fact that expectations are higher for higher levels of ed-
ucation) seem to support the assumption that survey respondents can understand
the concepts of expected average earnings and employment probability. While the
ROPE model may seem complicated, it is meant to represent an approximation of
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how youth would compare information about different education pathways when
deciding whether or not to invest in grade 12. Given the the theoretical and empir-
ical work by Keane and Wolpin (1997), which demonstrates that youths’ behaviour
is consistent with a model that includes many different education and career op-
tions, and where youth implicitly calculate what is analogous to the pathway values
of different options, assumption 3 seems reasonable.
We also need to consider how the information provided is used. We model
youth’s updated expectation after receiving the new information (E2) as a linear
function of their original expectation (E1) and the wage reported in the information
they receive (I)
E2 = αE1 + (1− α) I (2.16)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In the extreme case of α = 0, then E2 = I. In the other extreme,
the information provided is ignored and there is no updating of expectations. In
between theses two extremes lies a continuum of different combinations of E1
and E2 with the midpoint point being when α = 0.5. However, we must remain
agnostic about what the most realistic value of α is as we have no data on how
sensitive the individuals in our sample are to new information. In the analysis that
follows, we will consider the impact of interventions when α = 0 and when α = 0.5 ,
concentrating our discussion on the results for α = 0 as these results represent the
maximum potential impact of information provision. For all interventions, theses
two values of α are a good indication of the range of possible impacts for different
values of α. While values for α = 0.25 and for α = 0.75 were also tested for each
intervention the results are not qualitatively different from when α = 0 or α = 0.5
so are not presented.
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Depending on prior expectations, the information given and the value of α,
there is a range of possibilities for how the accuracy of expectations (as defined
above) may change following an intervention. We are particularly interested in
understanding how important the underestimation of returns to education is after
each of the interventions defined in table 2.4, given that such divergence between
subjectively expected and objectively estimated returns is proposed as the justi-
fication for these types of interventions (given that they may be associated with
underinvestment in education). In the analysis that follows we show that, in three
of the four interventions, it is possible that underestimation of the returns to ed-
ucation may increase following the intervention and that this divergence may be
especially important for African youth, the group that we consider to be most
disadvantaged in education and the labour market.
Although the possibility of underestimating the returns to education receives
much attention, the possibility of overestimation of the net returns to grade 12
may also be of concern as it may lead to overinvestment in education. This could
be a problem if it is associated with debt incurred to invest in education (which
cannot be repaid later on, because the individual finds a job with lower than
expected wages). In the analysis that follows, we show that in three of the four
interventions we consider, overestimation of the return to grade 12 may result for
at least one race group.
Lastly, it must be emphasised that for some youth a change in expectations
may be inconsequential even if an intervention leads them to have less accurate
expectations. For example, it may be optimal for a particular youth to invest in
grade 12 because of very high returns, which they accurately predict. If, after an
intervention, such expectations are raised to an unrealistic level, it will still be
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optimal to invest and therefore no harm will be caused by the intervention, even
if it reduces the accuracy of expectations.
As we do not have information on the direct costs of education, we do not esti-
mate the proportion of youth for which any of the interventions analysed here could
actually lead to a change in behaviour. Our focus on whether expectations would
be more or less accurate after an intervention (measured through the importance
of overestimation or underestimation) is justified by our interest in determining
whether an intervention is potentially harmful. This is no trivial issue as if we
have reason to believe that an intervention might be harmful to most or even some
youth, then that would be an argument in favour of changing the design of the
intervention. Our results demonstrate that issues of sequential decision making,
heterogeneity in the returns to education, and the way youth update their expec-
tations in response to an intervention should be considered before an intervention.
We now turn to the specific results of each intervention.
2.5.1 The simple intervention
In table 2.5 we present the observed and expected net value of grade 12, esti-
mated using the ROPE model. In addition, this table contains the expected net
value of grade 12 following an intervention where all youth are provided with just
two values, the average monthly earnings conditional on completion of grade 11
(R1756) and the average monthly earnings conditional on completing grade 12
(R2793). As mentioned above, when α = 0, following this intervention, expected
earnings will match the values provided by the intervention (or, in other words,
that youth replace their subjective expectations of returns to education with the
values provided by the intervention). The last three columns in this table compare
57
the overestimation percentage of returns to grade 12 before and after the interven-
tion, for α = 0.5 and for α = 0, respectively. We will firstly consider the results
in the last column, for α = 0. The immediate conclusion is that this intervention
results in an average increase in overestimation of total net value of grade 12, from
11% to 16% if we consider the intervention using ROPE specified for the whole
sample, and not conditional on race. This change results directly from considering
the effect of an information intervention when decisions are made sequentially and
option values are important: because the total value of grade 12 depends on higher
education options, overestimation or underestimation of the total value of grade
12 may not be reduced if only information on wages conditional on completion of
grades 11 and 12 is provided. In this case because youth initially overestimate the
value of grade 11, following the intervention they have a lower expectation of the
value of grade 11 and consequently a higher expectation of the net value of grade
12. It is important to emphasise that the net value of grade 12 depends on the
relative values of different pathways not on their absolute values.
Table 2.5: Simple intervention and the total net value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
All 740.3 818.3 839.9 861.6 10.5% 13.5% 16.4%
African 435.6 297.7 311.1 321.0 -31.7% -28.6% -26.3%
Coloured 444.7 455.6 530.7 569.1 2.5% 19.3% 28.0%
White 2809.2 2811.2 2813.1 2860.6 0.1% 0.1% 1.8%
However, the conclusion of increased overall overestimation of the total net
value of grade 12 masks important differences across races. These differences can
58
only be seen when ROPE is specified by race for all event probabilities and wage
rates. In particular, if we consider the impact of the simple intervention for each
race, we see that significant underestimation of the returns to grade 12 among
African youth has not been significantly reduced (from -32% to -26%). This is
because African youth initially underestimate the pathway value of grade 12 and
this is not effected by the simple intervention. In contrast, Coloureds now over-
estimate the returns to education by a large percentage (28%, against an initial
overestimation of only 2%). This is because they initially overestimate the value
of grade 11, which partially offsets their overestimation of other levels of educa-
tion but following the intervention the gap between grade 11 and higher education
becomes unrealistically large, leading to an overall increased overestimation.22
As previously noted, these results represent the maximum potential impact of
this intervention. However, they are qualitatively similar if we consider the impact
when α=0.5. In this case overall overestimation would increase to 13%, and the
disaggregation of these values along race lines would remains similar, with Africans,
Coloureds and Whites overestimating the total net value of grade 12 by -29%, 19%
and 0%, respectively. So in conclusion, it seems that regardless of the value of α,
the simple intervention would not meet our three criteria for intervention success
in this context.
2.5.2 The standard intervention
A natural improvement on the simple intervention would be to provide information
on the returns to higher education. The information intervention would then
22As previously noted, because ROPE is not a simple linear model, the results
using the sample in aggregate rather than splitting the sample by race are not a
weighted average of the results by race.
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involve providing information on additional earnings conditional on the conclusion
of 13-16 years of education (R3160 for 13 years, R3092 for 14 years, R4408 for 15
years, and R11,611 for 16 years). Its potential impact is presented in table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Standard intervention and the total net value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
All 740.3 818.3 755.3 740.3 10.5% 2.0% 0.0%
African 435.6 297.7 286.8 283.1 -31.7% -34.1% -35.0%
Coloured 444.7 455.6 520.9 675.7 2.5% 17.1% 51.9%
White 2809.2 2811.2 2553.9 2296.6 0.1% -9.1% -18.2%
If we focus on the overall importance of overestimation of returns to education,
it would seem that the intervention is useful, given that such overestimation dis-
appears or reduces, depending on α. However, the results look very different once
we consider its impact disaggregated by race. When we do, it is clear that the
standard intervention does not meet our criteria for intervention success.
For African youth, the standard intervention would actually increase average
underestimation of the net returns to grade 12. This is because they would now
underestimate the value of having 13 years of education as for this level of edu-
cation they have higher than average observed returns than Coloured and White
youth. Conversely, Coloured youth would greatly overestimate the returns to grade
12 following the intervention (by up to 52%). This is because observed returns to
higher education (particularly two and four year degrees) are lower for Coloured
youth than for White youth and African youth. Lastly, White youth, who had ac-
curate expectations before the intervention, would underestimate returns by up to
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18% following the intervention. This is because White youth generally have higher
observed returns to higher education than African and Coloured youth. Overall, it
is clear that for all race groups, the standard intervention is inferior to the simple
intervention. Again this intervention demonstrates that more information is not
always better or more helpful to individuals.
Given these results, it seems important to include the possibility of heteroge-
neous returns to education in the design of these interventions. In what follows, we
will consider this change to the two interventions analysed so far. Essentially, we
want to address the possibility that the potential for harm identified, particularly
in the case of the standard intervention, is due to the provision of irrelevant or
misleading information. However, as we show in the analysis of the results of the
targeted and full interventions, the provision of information that accounts for het-
erogeneity according to race, may not guarantee an improvement in the accuracy
of expectations.
2.5.3 The targeted intervention
Surprisingly, conducting the simple intervention with returns to grades 11 and 12
specified by race (the “targeted intervention”) would lead to very similar results
to the simple intervention. In table 2.7 it can be seen that African youth are no
better off with the targeted intervention than with the simple intervention, while
in the case of Coloured youth the increase in overestimation is significantly smaller
(17% versus 28% when α = 0, with the intuition for this being the same as for the
simple intervention). For White youth however, the intervention results in a small
underestimation of up to 2% which may be worse than the 2% overestimation that
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would result from the simple intervention when α = 0. 23
Table 2.7: Targeted intervention and the total net value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
All 740.3 818.3 839.9 861.6 10.5% 13.5% 16.4%
African 435.6 297.7 307.1 323.6 -31.7% -29.5% -25.7%
Coloured 444.7 455.6 488.7 521.7 2.5% 9.9% 17.3%
White 2809.2 2811.2 2779.7 2748.1 0.1% -1.1% -2.2%
Overall, this intervention is unambiguously better than the standard interven-
tion in this context, given that the latter reduces the accuracy of expectations of
each race group to a greater extent. However, it is unclear whether or not this
intervention is better than the simple intervention. We can only conclude that
providing information that takes into account heterogeneity but neglects the se-
quential nature of investment in education may reduce the accuracy of expectations
for some youth.
2.5.4 The full intervention
The previous analysis suggests that the cause of a reduction in expectations accu-
racy for at least some youth in each intervention is due to the type of information
provided. If true, a natural improvement on these interventions would be to pro-
vide values for the returns to all levels of education conditional on race. We would
consider this to be the provision of full information and following this intervention
23As for the simple and standard interventions, these conclusions are indepen-
dent of the value of α. While not reported, the results are similar for values of
α = 0.25 and for α = 0.75
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youth would have all the information needed to estimate the average return to
grade 12. Under the assumption that α = 0, this intervention would reduce over-
estimation to 0% for all race groups as presented in table 2.8. However, it is not
the case that the full intervention will always result in an increase in expectations
accuracy: the efficacy of the full intervention rests on our assumptions regarding
the nature of heterogeneity (that only race matters), and the way that youth use
information (that youth completely replace their prior expectation with the new
information).
Even if the heterogeneity assumption is correct, if youth do not completely
replace their prior expectations with the information provided, the full interven-
tion may lead to a reduction in expectations accuracy for some. While the full
intervention would increase expectations accuracy for African and White youth
regardless of the value of α, surprisingly when α = 0.5, Coloureds are induced to
underestimate the value of grade 12 by 6.6%. This is a net change in expectations
accuracy of -11%, which is greater than the net change in expectations accuracy
of 9% for Africans and 0% for Whites at this value of α. The relationship between
α and overestimation of total net value of grade 12 by Coloureds is graphed in
figure 2.3, with the intervention being least effective when α = 0.71.
The results would not be possible in a simple linear model of the value of grade
12. In a real options model (such as ROPE), expectations may change in such
a way that even though a particular option increases in value, another option is
preferred and so the increase in value of the first option is inconsequential. At
the same time, the preferred option may reduce in value, reducing the overall
value of education. For Coloureds, while 14 years of education is expected to have
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Table 2.8: Full intervention and the total net value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
All 740.3 818.3 755.3 740.3 10.5% 2.0% 0.0%
African 435.6 297.7 363.1 435.6 -31.7% -16.6% 0.0%
Coloured 444.7 455.6 415.5 444.7 2.5% -6.6% 0.0%
White 2809.2 2811.2 2810.2 2809.2 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Figure 2.3: Relationship between α and overestimation % for Coloureds
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a higher return than 13 years of education, the observed return to 13 years of
education is actually higher than the observed return for 14 years of education.
This means that when combining their expectations of wages with the new (and
correct) information, at some level of α, ROPE will switch from specifying grade 14
as being preferred to grade 13 being preferred. 24 However, unless that switching
point is reached, changes in expectations regarding these levels of education do not
lead to an overall increase in the net value of grade 12.
This provides definitive evidence that even if information is completely accurate
and relevant (given our assumptions, the full intervention is the provision of perfect
information), there is no guarantee that it will lead to an increase in expectations
accuracy. The impact will depend on how individuals respond to the information,
particularly as this relates to their prior expectation. It must be emphasised that
assuming that decision makers are rational (as we have done) is not enough to
guarantee that correct information will be beneficial when using a real options
model (though in a simple linear model it would be). More research on how agents
respond to information is needed as the literature in this area is sparse. 25. In
addition, it must be emphasised that assuming the information in this intervention
constitutes full information is likely to be an unrealistic assumption, which may
invalidate the results when α = 0. For example, if gender is an importance source
of heterogeneity in the returns to education, our intervention would be misleading
as it implies that only race matters, and not gender.
24This value of α is about 0.95 and for all values of between 0 and 0.95, the
impact of the intervention is to lead to an underestimation of the net value of
grade 12 among Coloureds, violating our criteria for intervention success.
25Wiswall and Zafar (2011) investigate with experiments, how college students
form and update their beliefs about future earnings. They find that while updating
behaviour seems logical, students display larger revision when the information
provided is more specific and is good news.
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In summary, the results for the four interventions provide the major contribu-
tion of this chapter: unless heterogeneity, the sequential nature of investment and
the way youth respond to information are all considered together, there is no way of
knowing whether or not an intervention may improve expectations accuracy. The
conclusions on the potential harm caused by information are robust to sensitivity
analysis of the key assumptions regarding our data and the ROPE model. The
results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in section 2.6. Firstly in section
2.6.1, we consider whether using gender as the variable associated with heterogene-
ity in the returns to education, leads to different results for the impact of the four
interventions. Secondly, in section 2.6.2, we consider whether including the entire
sample (instead of restricting the analysis only to full time employed individuals)
changes our conclusions regarding the effects of these interventions. Thirdly, in
section 2.6.1, we consider the impact of changing our assumption regarding the
average anticipated length of an individual’s career. In section 2.6.1, we consider
potential changes if we limit the set of higher education possibilities to 1 and 2
year diplomas and certificates, with no university level education being possible
(possibly because of their higher cost). Lastly, in section 2.6.1, we discuss one
possible limitation of our criteria for intervention success. For readers that wish
to skip the section on robustness, it is sufficient to note that all of the sensitivity
checks produce results that are qualitatively similar to the results reported in this
section.
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2.5.5 Policy implications: what to consider when inform-
ing youth about the returns to education?
While this chapter cannot provide a definitive answer to the question of how youth
should be informed about the returns to education, it does make a clear case for the
ways in which youth should not be informed about the returns to education. In do-
ing so, this chapter hopes to influence the planning of interventions by economists
or others wishing to help youth make better education investment choices. Inter-
ventions 1-3 demonstrate that unless both heterogeneity in the returns to education
and the sequential nature of investment in education are considered, information
interventions may reduce the accuracy of expectations. In addition, our consider-
ation of different possibilities for how youth may respond to information provided
(that is, different values of α) demonstrates that a full intervention may also reduce
the accuracy of expectations.
Also, even if youth were to be provided with more targeted and structured in-
formation that accounts for the issues of sequential choice and heterogeneity, it is
not clear what the most practical way of doing this would be. Youth could be ex-
plicitly presented with the information in the ROPE framework. This information
could be provided in the form of decision diagrams (as presented in the previous
sections) with outcomes conditional on individual characteristics, and inclusive of
all event probabilities. Without guidance to explain such diagrams to youth, they
could not be expected to understand such information. Thus even if such an in-
tervention were effective, it may not be low cost, like the Jensen intervention, or
even practically possible in some contexts. In addition, the possibility of this type
of intervention would depend on three things: 1) the potential of researchers to ac-
curately estimate the returns to education for different types of individuals 2) the
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potential of researchers to accurately measure the expectations of these youth and
3) An understanding of how youth will use the information provided. Our analysis
of different types of interventions demonstrates that any one of these alone could
be a critical problem. Our model and results suggest that research on each of these
issues should be conducted for every particular context where an intervention is
being considered prior to the design and implementation of the intervention. Not
doing so may risk causing harm to some youth.
Lastly, we have only considered giving youth data on conditional mean earn-
ings. Without giving individuals information about the variance in earnings, the
interventions we considered would not be giving youth much information about
the risk associated with investment in education (though the probability of un-
employment conditional on different education levels would be some information
about the riskiness of investment). If our assumptions that youth are risk neutral
is incorrect, then this may be an important issue. Even so, it is not clear how the
variance in earnings could easily be communicated. While Kerr et al. (2013) is
one study that provides more complex information in the context of Finland, this
is an area that should be researched further, especially for developing countries.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Heterogeneity in the returns to education by gender
For simplicity, we assumed that only heterogeneity in the returns to education
according to race was important, as only one dimension of heterogeneity is needed
to illustrate it’s potential importance to the impact of information interventions.
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However, ignoring other potential sources of heterogeneity may have an impact on
the results of the four interventions. There is evidence in South Africa that women
earn less than men, even after controlling for human capital and type of employ-
ment (Heintz and Posel, 2008, p.37). To test if the possibility of heterogeneity in
the returns to education by gender may matter, we specify the ROPE model for
gender instead of race. The results for the four interventions are presented in table
2.9, which also include for comparison, the original results for the ROPE model
specified unconditionally (All).
The first thing to note is that males have a higher observed return to grade 12
and also, a higher expectation of the return to grade 12 than females, which is not
surprising. Overall, expectations seem reasonably accurate for both genders with
males overestimating the net value of grade 12 by 2% and females overestimating
it by only 1%. While it may seem strange that overestimation in ROPE specified
for the whole sample (All), is much higher than overestimation when ROPE is
specified for males and females, it must be remembered that ROPE is not a linear
model and that the results for (All) are not a weighted average of the results for
males and females.
For an intervention to be deemed worthwhile according to the criteria in sec-
tion 5, it would have to reduce the overestimation for both genders without leading
to underestimation for either gender. None of the four interventions achieve this
except the full intervention when α = 0.26 The simple intervention would result in
an increase in average overestimation for both genders when α = 0. The standard
intervention could result in greater overestimation for females (up to 20%) while
26However, this finding as only reliable if there are no other sources of hetero-
geneity to the returns to education apart from gender (which as evidenced in the
main results, is not true as there is substantial heterogeneity according to race).
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Table 2.9: Gender, information interventions and the total net value of grade 12
(1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
Simple intervention
All 740.3 818.3 839.9 861.6 10.5% 13.5% 16.4%
Male 980.7 1002.7 1120.7 1155.8 2.2% 14.3% 17.9%
Female 703.5 710.7 705.4 719.5 1% 0.3% 2.3%
Standard intervention
All 740.3 818.3 755.3 740.3 10.5% 2.0% 0.0%
Male 980.7 1002.7 814.9 675.7 2.2% -16.9% -36.1%
Female 703.5 710.7 749.9 845.3 1% 6.6% 20.1%
Targeted intervention
All 740.3 818.3 839.9 861.6 10.5% 13.5% 16.4%
Male 980.7 1002.7 1059.3 1116 2.2% 8.0% 13.8%
Female 703.5 710.7 725.1 739.4 1% 3.1% 5.1%
Full intervention
All 740.3 818.3 755.3 740.3 10.5% 2.0% 0.0%
Male 980.7 1002.7 991.7 980.7 2.2% 1.1% 0.0%
Female 703.5 710.7 679.0 703.5 1% -3.5% 0.0%
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resulting in large underestimation for males (as much as -36.1%). The targeted
intervention is similar to the simple intervention and results in greater overestima-
tion for both genders. The full intervention interestingly, is not successful for all
values of α ≤ 0.92 (though not reported) and leads to underestimation for females
by 3.5% when α = 0.5.
Ideally, if gender in addition to other characteristics (such as race) drive het-
erogeneity in the returns to education, then ROPE should be specified for each
possible combination of relevant characteristics (e.g. black female). Due to the
limited number of observations in our data, we do not explore heterogeneity in
greater detail. However, the results for gender demonstrate that the ineffective-
ness of the interventions is not purely due to our selection of race as the key
dimension of heterogeneity. Even if there were only heterogeneity due to a binary
variable such as gender, the efficacy of interventions may be substantially affected.
2.6.2 Self-selection into employment
The data on wage expectations used include both those who were already in the
labour market and those who weren’t. It is possible that there are systematic
differences between the expectations of the unemployed and the employed. For
example, those that are not working may overestimate the earnings of others with
the same level of education. Also, some of those that are not working may not
want to work and may not have invested in education for economic returns. They
may consequently have lower expectations of the return to education than would
seem to justify rational investment. As we do not estimate the determinants of
expectations we do not know exactly why expectations may differ between those
who work and those who are jobless. For our purposes however, all that matters is
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whether or not self-selection in this regard impacts on our results. We can analyse
this by restricting the sample used to only those that are employed. The results
for the four interventions using only data for the employed are presented in table
2.10.
The results for the four interventions are qualitatively and quantitatively sim-
ilar to our original results. The simple intervention would result in a reduction
in average underestimation for Africans but would result in overestimation for
Coloureds and Whites. The standard intervention would also result in a reduction
in average underestimation of Africans and increased overestimation for Coloureds.
It would cause greater overestimation for Whites when α = 0 but a slight reduction
in overestimation for Whites if α = 0.5. The targeted intervention is unambigu-
ously better than the simple and standard interventions as it results in a reduction
in underestimation for Africans, a reduction in overestimation for Whites and a
smaller increase in overestimation for Coloureds than the first two interventions.
However, as the standard intervention still results in an increase in overestimation
for one group, it does not meet our criteria for a successful intervention. Lastly,
the impact of the full intervention could result in underestimation for Coloureds of
about 19%, in a similar way to our original results. Overall, it is clear that none
of the interventions are without the potential to cause harm.
2.6.3 Assumptions in ROPE regarding career length
Whether or not an individual appears to overestimates the net value of grade 12
in a sequential decision making framework such as ROPE, may depend on the
structure and assumptions of the model. One important assumption we make is
that individuals consider the returns to education over their whole career, which
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Table 2.10: Self selection of the employed, information interventions and the total
net value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
Simple intervention
All 740.3 862.3 907.2 952.1 16.5% 22.5% 28.6%
African 435.6 216.7 257.3 283.1 -50.2% -40.9% -35%
Coloured 444.7 453.7 517.4 587.6 2.0% 16.4% 32.1%
White 2809.2 3835.3 3826.0 3915.5 36.5% 36.2% 39.4%
Standard intervention
All 740.3 862.3 777.3 740.3 16.5% 5.0% 0.0%
African 435.6 216.7 247.5 283.1 -50.2% -43.2% -35%
Coloured 444.7 453.7 515.3 675.7 2.0% 15.9% 51.9%
White 2809.2 3835.3 3065.9 2296.6 36.5% 9.1% -18.2%
Targeted intervention
All 740.3 862.3 907.2 952.1 16.5% 22.5% 28.6%
African 435.6 216.7 250.0 288.3 -50.2% -42.6% -33.8%
Coloured 444.7 453.7 496.8 540 2.0% 11.7% 21.4%
White 2809.2 3835.3 3819.1 3803 36.5% 36.0% 35.4%
Full intervention
All 740.3 862.3 777.3 740.3 16.5% 5.0% 0.0%
African 435.6 216.7 323.7 435.6 -50.2% -25.7% 0.0%
Coloured 444.7 453.7 361.0 444.7 2.0% -18.8% 0.0%
White 2809.2 3835.3 3322.2 2809.2 36.5% 18.3% 0.0%
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lasts until the age of life expectancy at birth.27 We also assumed that the discount
rate for future returns exactly equalled the growth rate in wages. If wages growth
occurs mostly early on in the career (e.g. before the age of 35) and individuals
are short sighted, we may have overweighed the long run returns to education in
ROPE. In case our assumption about long run returns is too strong, we specify
the ROPE model in table 2.11 until the age of 35, effectively setting the discount
rate beyond the age of 35 to 1 + g. 28
Firstly, we note that the change in our assumption does lead to different mea-
sures of the initial overestimation and underestimation of the total net value of
grade 12. Underestimation for Africans increases from about 32% to about 37%,
while Coloureds, who previously overestimated by about 3%, now underestimate
the net value of grade 12 by about 5%. Conversely, overestimation for Whites
increases from about 0% to about 2%. These results demonstrate that changing
the assumption about career length/ discounting, does not have straightforward
impacts on our measure of the accuracy of expectations. For some groups it may
yield higher measures of underestimation, while for other groups it may lead to
higher levels of overestimation. In any case, results for the four interventions are
qualitatively similar to the original results and none of our conclusions regarding
27Another assumption regarding our model that may be important is in regards
to grade repetition and re-enrollment, which as found by Pugatch (2012) using
CAPS data, are very important in the context of South Africa. While extending
the model to account for re-enrollment possibilities would be possible, we do not do
so as this would significantly complicate the model without adding to the argument
here that assumptions about ROPE may impact on our measures of expectations
accuracy.
28Also, we use the age of 35 as information interventions such Oreopoulos and
Dunn (2013) and Jensen (2010) involve the provision of information on the average
earnings of those aged 35 who are working. This implies that youth targeted with
information in these studies are concerned with the future returns to education at
least up until the age of 35.
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Table 2.11: Short career length, information interventions and the total net value
of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
Simple intervention
All 283.5 307.3 317.9 328.5 8.4% 12.2% 15.9%
African 175.9 111.2 117.6 124.5 -36.8% -33.2% -29.2%
Coloured 171.7 162.5 197.1 215.2 -5.4% 14.8% 25.3%
White 1031.8 1046.9 1050.6 1073 1.5% 1.8% 4%
Standard intervention
All 283.5 307.3 282.2 283.5 8.4% -0.5% 0.0%
African 175.9 111.2 109.9 108.5 -36.8% -37.6% -38.3%
Coloured 171.7 162.5 196.1 260.7 -5.4% 14.2% 51.8%
White 1031.8 1046.9 947.9 849 1.5% -8.1% -17.7%
Targeted intervention
All 283.5 307.3 317.9 328.5 8.4% % 15.9%
African 175.9 111.2 119.6 128 -36.8% % -27.3%
Coloured 171.7 162.5 178.0 193.5 -5.4% % 12.7%
White 1031.8 1046.9 1032.0 1017.1 1.5% % -1.4%
Full intervention
All 283.5 307.3 282.2 283.5 8.4% -0.5% 0.0%
African 175.9 111.2 143.6 175.9 -36.8% -18.4% 0.0%
Coloured 171.7 162.5 157.3 171.7 -5.4% -8.4% 0.0%
White 1031.8 1046.9 1039.3 1031.8 1.5% 0.7% 0.0%
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their efficacy change, as each intervention fails to meet our criteria for success. For
example, the standard intervention may lead to Whites underestimating the value
of grade 12 by about 18% while the full intervention may cause underestimation
of Coloureds to increase to about 8% when α = 0.5.
We also used the ROPE model under the alternative assumption that the age of
retirement (age 65) is used instead of life expectancy. Our original assumption that
life expectancy is the upper bound for career length effectively implied a discount
rate beyond the age of 56 to be 1 + g. Setting the age to 65 effectively means
setting a discount rate equal to g until the age of 65 and setting the discount
rate to 1 + g thereafter. This would be appropriate if youth do not anticipate
dying before retirement age but rather, anticipate working until retirement age.
We report the results in table 2.12. Clearly, these results are very similar to the
original results and none of our conclusions regarding intervention efficacy change.
Though not reported, all integer life expectancies from 30-65 were tested with no
qualitative difference to the results. Also not reported, in the case where expected
career length were to differ sharply by race, for example 45 for Africans, 55 for
Coloureds and 65 for Whites, all results remain qualitatively the same.
Lastly, it should be noted that a traditional discount rate was not used in
the analysis as we assume that youth think in nominal terms (following Jensen
(2010)).This assumption is consistent with short-sightedness being modelled as
short career length. However, even if youth do not think precisely in terms of
a constant discount rate, it may be a better approximation of how they view
the future than simply assuming a short career. For this reason, I tested integer
discount rates from 1%-15% with g = 0 as a further robustness check of results
for the ages of 35, 56, and 65 though the results are not reported in the interest of
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Table 2.12: Career till retirement age, information interventions and the total net
value of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
Simple intervention
All 926.9 1027.0 1053.2 1079.3 10.8% 13.6% 16.4%
African 541.6 374.6 390.9 402.7 -30.8% -27.8% -25.6%
Coloured 556.2 575.4 666.9 713.6 3.4% 19.9% 28.3%
White 3535.2 3531.9 3533.0 3590.8 -0.1% -0.1% 1.6%
Standard intervention
All 926.9 1027.0 948.5 926.9 10.8% 2.3% 0.0%
African 541.6 374.6 359.1 354.4 -30.8% -33.7% -34.6%
Coloured 556.2 575.4 653.6 845.2 3.4% 17.5% 52.0%
White 3535.2 3531.9 3209.9 2887.9 -0.1% -9.2% -18.3%
Targeted intervention
All 926.9 1027.0 1053.2 1079.3 10.8% 13.6% 16.4%
African 541.6 374.6 384.7 403.5 -30.8% -29.0% -25.5%
Coloured 556.2 575.4 615.6 655.8 3.4% 10.7% 17.9%
White 3535.2 3531.9 3493.5 3455.2 -0.1% -1.2% -2.3%
Full intervention
All 926.9 1027.0 948.5 926.9 10.8% 2.3% 0.0%
African 541.6 374.6 452.7 541.6 -30.8% -16.4% 0.0%
Coloured 556.2 575.4 521.0 556.2 3.4% -6.3% 0.0%
White 3535.2 3531.9 3533.5 3535.2 -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
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space. I tested a total of 45 combinations of discount rate and age, with α = 0 for
all interventions and also α = 0.5 for the full intervention. For all interventions
and for all discount rates tested, the interventions failed to meet the criteria for
intervention success (except for the full intervention when α = 0), though some
discount rates did substantially change the impact of the interventions, as is the
case with the robustness checks for different ages reported above.
2.6.4 Credit constraints
If youth anticipate not being able to afford some levels of higher education be-
cause they face credit constraints, then these options may not be considered in the
decision to invest in grade 12. In South Africa, like most countries, higher educa-
tion can be an expensive investment and some youth many not enrol in university
when it is optimal to do so because of credit constraints. Attanasio and Kaufmann
(2009) is one study that focuses on the importance of credit constraints and the
possibility that they ‘break’ the link between expectations and investment in ed-
ucation. One limiting simplification of ROPE is that all direct costs to education
are assumed to be zero, implicitly ignoring the importance of credit constraints.
However, if credit constraints do limit the number of possible education pathways,
it may be that the dangers of information provision are not as significant. To test
this hypothesis, we specify a variation of ROPE with only two higher education
options: 1 year of higher education or 2 years of higher education. Effectively, we
are assuming that all youth are credit constrained to the same degree. In table
2.13, we report results for the four interventions with this variation of ROPE.
The results are quantitatively very different but qualitatively similar to the orig-
inal results. Firstly, it now seems as though Whites greatly overestimate the value
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Table 2.13: Credit constraints, information interventions and the total net value
of grade 12 (1000R’s)
Observed Expected Overestimation
Original α = 0.5 α = 0 Original α = 0.5 α = 0
Simple intervention
All 384.2 576.9 591.8 615.6 47.8% 54.0% 60.2%
African 399.2 235.0 248.5 259.5 -41.1% -37.7% -35.0%
Coloured 413.9 402.1 477.3 516.5 -2.9% 15.3% 24.8%
White 584.8 1388.2 1410.9 1463.1 137.4% 141.3% 150.2%
Standard intervention
All 384.2 576.9 442.4 384.2 47.8% 15.1% 0.0%
African 399.2 235 209.7 192.9 -41.1% -47.5% -51.7%
Coloured 413.9 402.1 399.5 486 -2.9% -3.5% 17.4%
White 584.8 1388.2 980.7 573.3 137.4% 67.7% -2.0%
Targeted intervention
All 384.2 576.9 591.8 615.6 47.8% 54.0% 60.2%
African 399.2 235.0 246.6 266.7 -41.1% -38.2% -33.2%
Coloured 413.9 402.1 435.7 469.3 -2.9% 5.3% 13.4%
White 584.8 1388.2 1353.6 1319.0 137.4% 131.5% 125.6%
Full intervention
All 384.2 576.9 442.4 384.2 47.8% 15.1% 0.0%
African 399.2 235 312.8 399.2 -41.1% -21.6% 0.0%
Coloured 413.9 402.1 363.5 413.9 -2.9% -12.2% 0.0%
White 584.8 1388.2 986.5 584.8 137.4% 68.7% 0.0%
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of grade 12 (about 138%), while Africans still greatly underestimate the value of
grade 12 (48%) and Coloureds slightly underestimate the value of grade 12. like the
original results, while underestimation is reduced for African youth by the simple,
full and targetted interventions, the standard intervention increases underestima-
tion. Also similar to our original results, the first and third interventions lead to
greater overestimation for Coloureds while the full intervention leads to underes-
timation. Also similar to our original results, overestimation increases for White
youth following the simple intervention and becomes an underestimation following
the standard intervention. In summary, none of the four interventions meet our
criteria for intervention success, leaving our original conclusions unchanged.
2.6.5 Criteria for intervention success
Lastly, we note one weakness of our criteria for intervention success: there is no
consideration of the potential impact of interventions on the variance of expecta-
tions. While in three out of four interventions, average underestimation among
Africans would be reduced this does not imply that the number of those underes-
timating would likewise be reduced or be unchanged. In fact, the number of those
underestimating the returns following interventions 1 and interventions 4 could
actually increase. This is because before the intervention, as there is variance in
expectations, some African youth overestimate the earnings conditional on grades
11 and 12 and some African youth underestimate earnings conditional on grades
11 and 12. There would be no variance if α=0. Following the simple intervention
for example, all African youth may underestimate the returns to grade 12 by 26%.
How this would affect educational investment is unclear but it cannot be assumed
that a reduction in average underestimation would lead to educational investment
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that is equal to or greater for African youth than if there had been no intervention,
unless inaccuracy is reduced to 0%. In any case, this issue could not affect our
conclusion regarding the efficacy of interventions in this context as none of the
four interventions meet our (arguably) weak criteria. Making the criteria much
more stringent (for example, adding a criterion that following the intervention, no
one should underestimate the returns to grade 12) would still imply that all four
interventions are not successful.
2.6.6 Implications for each type of intervention
This section has tested the robustness of our results to changes in several key
assumptions about our model and the data. For each intervention in each sen-
sitivity check, at least one groups’ expectations are made less accurate, violating
our criteria for intervention success. When α = 0, the simple intervention leads
to overestimation for Coloureds and Whites if the sample is restricted to those
that are employed, if we change assumptions about the career length, or if we
consider credit constraints. Also, it leads to overestimation of males and females if
ROPE is specified according to gender (about 18% and 2%, respectively). When
α = 0, the standard intervention leads to overestimation for females (about 20%)
and underestimation for males (about 36%), while it leads to overestimation for
Coloureds in all other sensitivity checks. The targeted intervention leads to over-
estimation for males and females (about 14% and 5%, respectively), while it also
leads to overestimation for Coloureds in all other sensitivity checks. Lastly, when
α = 0.5, the full intervention leads to underestimation for females (about -3%)
while in all other sensitivity checks it leads to underestimation for Coloureds just
like the results in 2.5.4.
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Overall, the results of these sensitivity checks are important because they
demonstrate that the dangers of information provision do not occur simply be-
cause of a very specific combination of model and data assumptions. If the ROPE
model is changed substantially, or if we change our assumption about the source
of heterogeneity, it is clear that the dangers of information remain realistic possi-
bilities (as opposed to simply being theoretical possibilities).
While beyond the scope of this chapter, there are at least three significant
extensions to ROPE that could make it considerably more realistic (though more
complicated) but that would require either substantial changes to the model or
data that is not available in CAPS. These possible extensions are 1) the inclusion
of positive education costs, 2) the option of repetition, and 3) the option of re-
entry into education once an individual has entered the labour market. The likely
impact of each of these extensions on the conclusions of this chapter is discussed
below:
1. The inclusion of positive education costs for each grade beyond grade 11
should reduce the net value of grade 12 and the pathway value of grade 12.
It may also change the level of overestimation for each race. However, the
results of the interventions should remain qualitatively similar as they are
driven by changes to the expected relative net benefits of different education
pathways, and such changes would occur regardless of the costs of education.
2. If youth are able to repeat a grade that they fail in the following year, this
option of repetition will increase the gross return to that grade of education.
However, whether or not this increases the pathway value of grade 12 will de-
pend on the pass probabilities for each race. Though not reported, we tested
one example extension to ROPE, where grade 12 may be repeated one time
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with the same probability of failure and where a pass can only occur without
exemption on this second attempt. In this situation, compared to the orig-
inal model, the pathway value percentage for African youth increases from
52.1% to 56.6% but the pathway value for White youth decreases slightly,
from 67.2% to 67.0%. Regardless of the pathway value percentage, the over-
all gross value of the grade being repeated will increase (as repetition is
always an option that is only chosen when it is relatively better than the
alternative of entering the labour market). So it should be noted that both
relative values of pathways and the absolute values of different levels of edu-
cation will be different in a model with repetition. However, this should not
change the potential dangers of information interventions. Regardless of the
options available for repetition, individuals still need to make choices based
on the expected relative benefits of different levels of education (particularly
in ROPE, the net value of grade 12). In the example extension we tested,
the results of the four interventions remain qualitatively the same with no
intervention meeting our criteria for success for both values of α.
3. Unlike repetition and positive education costs, the option to re-enter educa-
tion after a period in the labour market may have implications for the dangers
of information provision. In particular, if an individual can change pathways
after experiencing a negative outcome (such as unemployment or obtaining
a low wage job), then the decision to continue onto grade 12 directly after
grade 11 becomes much less critical. By extension, information provision
that can impact on this decision also becomes less critical. For example,
following the Standard intervention, African youth have lower expectations
of the net value of grade 12. Suppose that this caused them to leave school
83
after grade 11 but that they later realised it was a mistake and so re-enrolled
in grade 12 one year later. In this case, they would not have lost a lifetimes’
worth of higher income, as would have been the case if re-entry to school
was not allowed. Further research would need to be done to explore how
significant the possibility of re-entry into education is likely to be.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper developed a real options model of investment in education and applied
it to an ex ante evaluation of the potential impacts of information interventions
aimed at improving the accuracy of expectation.
Using data from the Cape Area Panel Study in South Africa, it showed the
potential policy relevance of information interventions for at least a subset of indi-
viduals, by identifying substantial differences between the expected and observed
total value of grade 12 among African youth (though not for Coloured and White
youth). This difference is due mainly from differences in the expected and ob-
served pathway value of grade 12 (that is, the value of the option to pursue higher
education) for African youth.
The impacts of information provision regarding the returns to education were
then considered using the Real Options Pathways for Education (ROPE) model,
considering the issues of education investment options and heterogeneity in the re-
turns to education that received less attention in the existing interventions. Firstly,
it was found that information that does not account for possible heterogeneity in
the returns to education or higher education options (the simple intervention),
would do very little to reduce African youths’ underestimation of the net value of
grade 12. Providing information on returns to grade 12 (but not on higher edu-
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cation) according to race (the targeted intervention) would not seem to be more
helpful than the simple intervention, at least for Africans (and Whites) who, as
noted, undervalue the options open with the completion of higher education. The
standard intervention, which provides information on all wage outcomes (and, as
such, addresses this limitation) but does not consider heterogeneity of returns,
would potentially be greatly harmful leading to significant underestimation by
African and White youth (35% and 18%, respectively). Lastly, results for the full
intervention demonstrate that even when both heterogeneity and the sequential
nature of investment are considered, the intervention may lead to a substantial
increase in underestimation, the extent of which depends on how new information
is used by youth to update their prior expectations.
These results should be seen as a cautionary note regarding the potential and
shortcomings of information interventions. To our knowledge, this paper is the first
to demonstrate this possibility using real data on observed outcomes and expected
outcomes. Similar analyses to this one could be conducted prior to any information
intervention where option values and/or heterogeneity in returns are important
to evaluate, ex ante, the potential limitations of different types of information
provision. Lastly, it must be emphasised that the main contribution of this paper
was not to investigate the accuracy of earnings expectations in South Africa and
suggest policies for that particular context, but rather to demonstrate a specific
analytical approach to planning and evaluating information interventions ex ante.
In particular, this approach allows interventions to be checked for their potential
to reduce the accuracy of expectations, and in doing so, potentially reduce the
efficiency of economic choices.
Chapter 3
Social Networks and Wages in South
Africa
3.1 Introduction
An extensive literature in economics and other social sciences, recently reviewed
in Marsden and Gorman (2001), Ioannides and Loury (2004) and Topa (2011),
analyses the importance of social networks for the functioning of labour markets. 1
One of the stylised facts that emerges from this work is that their use is pervasive
and generally productive. As a result, a large fraction of jobs are found through
social networks. 2
Given this empirical regularity, an important economic question that follows is
whether the use of social networks affects labour market outcomes, in particular
wages and tenure, and if they do, for whom. As Mouw (2003, p. 868) notes, “This
1The use of social networks refers to job seekers communicating with friends,
relatives and acquaintances about employment opportunities and firms using in-
formal referrals and recommendations to find workers.
2This is true in both developed and developing countries. See, for example,
Bewley (1999) who finds that, in the USA, 30-60% of the jobs are found through
social contacts. See also Granovetter (1974) and Holzer (1987) for the USA and
Bentolila and Suarez (2010) for a recent analysis of the role of social networks in
several countries of the European Union. In developing countries see Magruder
(2010) and Burns, Godlonton, and Keswell (2010) for evidence in South Africa,
Calvo-Armegnol and Zenou (2005) for an analysis of the role of social networks
in the functioning of the labour market in Egypt, and Lawler et al. (1995) for
a comparison of human resource management practices of firms in India and in
Thailand and the extent of use of internal referrals to fill different jobs.
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is no trivial issue. If using contacts seems to have little overall impact on labour
market outcomes, then perhaps economic models of the labour market can safely
ignore ‘embeddedness’ . . . without sacrificing explanatory power.”
The growing number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, that address
this question can be organized around two competing hypotheses. The first is the
“good matches” hypothesis, which dates back to a seminal study by Rees (1966).
More formally, Montgomery (1991), Saloner (1985) and Simon and Warner (1992),
interpret social networks as screening or monitoring mechanisms that increase the
quality of the match between worker and firm by reducing informational asymme-
tries, leading to higher productivity which would be reflected by a higher wage.
Alternatively, the “limited choices” hypothesis, initially suggested by Loury (2006),
interprets social networks as mechanisms that allocate workers to jobs at a rela-
tively low cost for both firms and prospective workers. Because search through
networks is limited by network characteristics, including the job information that
its members have access to, this type of search may lead to sub-optimal matches
and associated wage penalties.
We briefly review both of these different interpretations in section 3.2. We
emphasise that they share one important similarity: that the importance of the
referee, both in terms of motivation and identity, is usually unexamined. 3 Rather,
a simple assumption is usually made that “present workers tend to refer people like
themselves . . . ” (Rees, 1966, p. 562). Although the importance of homophily, that
“birds of a feather flock together”, has long been recognized in the social network
literature (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001, for a review), these two
competing hypotheses emphasize different aspects of similarity between members
3A referee is someone that refers an individual to a job and/or refers a job to
an individual.
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of a network: productive ability in the first case, identity in the second.
In section 3.2 we also discuss some of the recent work that addresses the possible
conflict between these two dimensions of the referee’s decision. We also raise the
possibility of referee opportunism, that is, that referees may indicate someone who
is not of high ability but who is socially close. An intuitive consequence of this
possibility that we explore in this paper, is that firms may react by applying a wage
penalty that is a positive function of how close the referee is to the worker. This
prediction is close in spirit, to the important study by Granovetter (1974) which
emphasises the positive impact of increased social distance (weak ties) between
referee and job seeker, on the probability of finding a job.
Focusing on the referee and their incentives is important because previous re-
search has found it to impact on the type of person connected to the job and the
quality of their work (e.g. Magruder and Beaman (2012)). We do not directly
observe the incentives of the referee but assume that they are linked strongly to
the identity of the referee (which is observed in our data). Particularly, if the
difference in social proximity between friends and relatives is systematic and in
the direction we assume (that relatives are closer than friends), we can infer that
relatives have a greater incentive to risk referring unsuitable workers.
We empirically estimate the effects on wages of finding a job through the use
of different social contacts using data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS),
which we present, succinctly, in section 3.3. The CAPS data is particularly valu-
able for this purpose, for two reasons. The first is the wealth of information in
CAPS on respondents’ employment outcomes, job search methods, and personal
characteristics such as education and working experience, for a large sample of
youth across several years (2002-2006). The second is the importance of the func-
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tioning of the labour market in addressing issues of poverty and inequality in the
South African context, a point that we also discuss, briefly, in section 3.3.
In section 3.4 we present our results. We find that, while controlling for indi-
vidual and job characteristics, including unobserved heterogeneity, finding a job
through social networks carries a wage penalty for all race groups. This suggests
that the “good matches” hypothesis finds no support in the context of South Africa.
This negative effect is compounded by social proximity, especially in the case of
African youth, with higher penalties associated with the use of contacts who are
socially closer. 4
We conclude in section 3.5. An understanding of the significance of social
networks to individual job search outcomes may have important policy implications
in the high unemployment context of South Africa. If youth are using social
networks to acquire jobs even though they are associated with large wage penalties,
this may be a sign that labour market institutions do not facilitate formal job search
for these individuals to find more suitable employment.
3.2 Wages and social networks: a brief review of the liter-
ature
Most of the economic studies of the role of social networks in the functioning of
labour markets build on the job matching approach and its assumption that not all
4A note on terminology. We adopt the labels used in CAPS and by Seekings and
Nattrass (2005, p.ix) and use the word ‘African’ to refer to peoples classified under
apartheid as “native”, “bantu” or “black”, the word ‘White’ to refer to people
classified as European or white, and the word ‘Coloured’ to refer to the people
that don’t fit the first two categories, including descendants of the indigenous
Khoi and San, the descendants of “Malay” slaves from Indonesia and those with
mixed race ancestry.
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matches between workers and firms are optimal. Prospective workers are hetero-
geneous in preferences for different types of jobs and in their productivity in those
jobs, while jobs are heterogeneous in the skills required and in their non pecuniary
characteristics (Johnson, 1978, Jovanovic, 1979, Viscusi, 1980). Uncertainty and
imperfect information about any of these aspects may lead some hired workers to
be poor matches for the jobs they hold, either because the job seeker misjudges
the job or the firm misjudges the prospective worker. The use of social networks
in job search is then seen as an effective method for firms and potential workers
to improve the matching process (Montgomery, 1991, Saloner, 1985, Simon and
Warner, 1992), at relatively low costs (Holzer, 1987). The label “better matches”
derives from this interpretation.
If the use of job contacts makes it more likely that job seekers and firms will
obtain accurate information about each other, then this should impact positively
on wages and tenure. For example, in the model proposed by Jovanovic (1979)
wages are positively related to tenure. If a job match turns out to be poor, it is
more likely that job separation will occur earlier rather than later (that is, as soon
as the low quality of the match becomes apparent to the worker and the firm)
while longer tenure is a sign that the worker is suitable for the job. Similarly, if
wages are set equal to worker’s marginal product, they should be higher on average
for those workers that are proven to be productive and consequently have longer
tenure. Simon and Warner (1992) extend this reasoning to suggest that wages may
be higher from the start of employment for a worker that is referred to the firm as
the firm anticipates higher than average productivity.
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that workers refer others like them-
selves and that because of this, “worker referrals . . . usually provide good screening
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for firms who are satisfied with their present workforce”(Rees, 1966, p.562). This
assumption is also explicitly made in Montgomery (1991), where the motivations
of the referee are replaced with the assumption that abilities are correlated across
individual members of a network. However, the benefits of a network are con-
ditional on its characteristics and there is abundant evidence that homophily in
networks is not limited to one specific characteristic (in this case, ability). Rather,
homophily spans several characteristics such as gender, race and age, that are not
inherently productive.
The “limited choices” hypothesis emphasises that there may be costs associated
with the use of social networks precisely because productivity irrelevant character-
istics play a role in network formation and, as such, in access to the information it
may transmit. While networks may be used because of convenience and low mon-
etary costs relative to formal methods, they provide the job seeker with a range of
job opportunities limited by the characteristics of their social network. These job
opportunities may not be suited to the characteristics of the job seeker, unlike the
wider range of jobs that are potentially available through formal methods (Bento-
lila and Suarez, 2010). As a result, wages in jobs found through social networks
will be equal to or lower than in jobs found through formal methods. The clearly
contrasting wage implications of the limited choices and good matches hypotheses
can be used to empirically test between these two hypotheses. 5
5It is important to note, as Loury (2006) does, that whilst longer job tenure
should be the result of good matches it may also be consistent with the limited
choices hypothesis and so can not be a definitive test between the theories. Simon
and Warner (1992) argue that jobs obtained through contacts with more infor-
mation (i.e., recruiters or acquaintances inside the firm) lasted significantly longer
than jobs obtained through want ads or private agencies and that this is evidence
of the benefits of using networks. In contrast however, Topel and Ward (1992)
argue that the average young worker holds seven jobs in the first 10 years of his
working life and that job mobility accounts for one-third of wage growth during this
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Several recent studies have provided support to the “limited choices” hypothe-
sis. Combining personnel files and job-histories of workers at a manufacturing firm,
Antoninis (2006) found that new recruits receive a higher starting wage when rec-
ommended to the job by an individual with direct experience of their productivity
but that the use of referrals from friends and relatives has no effect on the starting
wage and may even be negatively related to wages in unskilled jobs. Similarly,
Bentolila and Suarez (2010) found that contacts are associated with wage dis-
counts of at least 2.5%, although they also reduce unemployment duration by 1-3
months on average, while Pellizzari (2010), using data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel, finds that penalties and premiums are equally common
across the countries, a result that he attributes to the mediating effect of the labour
market institutions of each country. 6
Of particular interest in this paper is the idea, suggested by Loury (2006)
and Calvo-Armegnol and Jackson (2007), that heterogeneity in the characteristics
of social networks may result in the possibility of the limited choices hypothesis
finding support for some job seekers but not for others, that is, that different popu-
lation groups may experience different network effects according to the differences
in the characteristics of their networks. An extensive literature provides empirical
support to this possibility.
Korenman and Turner (1996) reported that, among young workers in inner-city
period. If workers chose to change jobs voluntarily this must be because of having
better alternative jobs available and so such job mobility should increase wages.
In contrast, young workers that stick with jobs for longer than average periods of
time may miss out on opportunities to obtain higher wages. Keith and McWilliams
(1995) and Abbott and Beach (1994) show that the effects of job mobility on wages
depend on whether the job change was voluntary or involuntary. Both studies find
that voluntary separation increases wages while involuntary separation does not.
6Finally, several other studies have found no wage effect associated the use of
informal search methods (Bridges and Villemez, 1986, Holzer, 1987, Mouw, 2003).
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Boston, Whites who found jobs through contacts received much larger wage gains
(19% higher) than Blacks with similar observable characteristics. Smith (2000)
showed that gender wage differences were small for those using formal job-search
methods. In contrast, she found larger wage differences between Hispanics and
Whites who used personal contacts to find jobs compared to those who used more
formal means.
Using data on contacts amongst a group of Dartmouth college seniors, Mar-
maros and Sacerdote (2002) found that the students networking with fraternity/sorority
alumni were more likely to get better paying and more prestigious jobs. However,
there were significant gender and race differences and the type of contacts used
had an impact on the quality of employment found. For example, women were less
likely to get fraternity/sorority help, more likely to use help from professors and
equally likely to get help from relatives. Loury (2006) also finds heterogeneity in
network effects according to the gender of the contact, with prior generation male
relatives having a positive and larger effect than female friends and relatives.
It is also important to consider that networks are not formed with the sole
purpose of disseminating information important for the functioning of the labour
market, rather they may provide a variety of functions (including, and importantly
in developing countries, insurance). It seems likely that there will exist spill-overs
from one context/purpose to another. This possibility was also raised by Rees
(1966), who notes that “the few firms who deliberately avoid informal sources are
either those who are seeking to upgrade their work force or those who have had
bad experience with nepotism or cliques” (p. 562, emphasis added). Similarly,
Antoninis (2006, p.135) remarks, in criticising Montgomery’s (1991) assumption
of correlated abilities between referees and job seekers, that “. . . one observes that
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individuals take active steps to ensure employment for members of their family
network for reasons that are often unrelated to whether their relative has a similar
level of ability. Firms often respond to such recommendations favorably despite
their knowledge that they may have little to do with the new recruits’ productivity
potential”.
Some recent work (Magruder and Beaman, 2012, Fafchamps and Moradi, 2009,
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010) analyzes the possible implications of this
overlap for productivity in a variety of contexts, concluding that referee oppor-
tunism may lead to lower productivity. The results of Magruder and Beaman
(2012) are particularly interesting in this context. The authors asked workers
to refer people for a task. Referees were randomly allocated to two groups: they
would either receive a fixed amount per referral or an amount that depended on the
performance of the referred person. When referral is made contingent on worker’s
productivity, participants are less likely to refer a relative and more likely to refer
someone with high productivity. Additionally, the effect of the incentive depends
on the quality of the referee: participants of low ability do not seem capable of re-
cruiting high ability workers. This work then provides mixed support to the “good
matches” hypothesis: although referee and worker’s ability may be correlated (as
assumed by Montgomery (1991)), they do not need to be in the absence of the
right incentive, in which case referee’s are motivated by the exchange of favors
with friends and relatives.
The consequences of such opportunistic behavior are intuitively simple: firms
may withdraw from reliance on social networks as a recruitment mechanism (as
mentioned in Rees (1966)) or may take into account such productivity-irrelevant
motivations when making a (lower) wage offer. Because the motivation to refer
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someone who is not necessarily a good match should increase the closer the referee
is to the worker, so should the wage penalty. If relatives of the worker are gener-
ally socially closer to the worker than friends, as we assume, then wage penalties
associated with matches through relatives should be higher than wage penalties as-
sociated with matches made through friends. In section 3.4 we present estimates of
the effect of social networks which support this interpretation, particularly among
the group who experience higher unemployment rates (African youth).
3.3 Context and Data: Social Networks andWages in South
Africa
In South Africa, unemployment has been persistently high, having increased in the
decade following the end of apartheid and remaining high ever since (Kingdon and
Knight, 2004, 2007). As in other countries, youth unemployment is higher than
the overall rate. 7 Race still plays an important role in describing unemployment.
Morrow, Panday, and Richter (2005), using data from a 2002 Labour Force Survey,
found a very high rate of youth unemployment for Africans (above 60%), compared
to White and Coloured youths (less than 10%).
Burns, Godlonton, and Keswell (2010) argue that, in such a context of high un-
employment, it may be rational to decide not to actively search for work through
formal methods if the cost of such search is high and there are significant op-
portunities to find work through networks. They also study the productivity of
social networks in the context of the South African labour market, defining social
7At the end of 2010, Statistics South Africa reported unemployment for the last
quarter of that year at 24% (defined as individuals aged 15-65 searching for work
and not currently working).
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networks as language groups and finding that its use increases employment prob-
ability between 3-12%. The productivity of social networks in South Africa is also
studied by Magruder (2010), who focuses on the role of the employment status of
fathers on the employment probabilities of sons, and finds that a 10% growth rate
in the father’s industry led to an increase of 3-4% in the employment probability
of sons. His conclusion that fathers are critical network members for their sons
has important implications for the persistence of inequality in South Africa which,
as shown by Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001), is determined primarily by the func-
tioning of the labour market. The higher productivity of social networks in terms
of employment probability would then limit intergenerational mobility (Magruder,
2010), creating a cycle that is akin to the mechanism of inequality traps presented
in Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Walton (2007).8
However, the variation in employment probability is not the only way in which
social networks may relate to inequality. Wage inequality among the employed may
also matter if jobs found through networks vary systematically from jobs found
through formal search or, more simply, if the use of contacts does not improve
the quality of the match between firms and job seekers. Previous studies have not
related wages and job search method to explore this possibility.
This paper uses data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), described in
Lam, Seekings, and Sparks (2008), to address the question of whether the use of so-
cial networks has an impact on wages. 9 CAPS is a longitudinal study of a random
8Recent theoretical work suggests that the implications of the use of social net-
works in the labour market are in fact not trivial, and can range from differences in
the aggregate unemployment rate (Kuzubas, 2010) to long run inequality between
groups (Calvo-Armegnol and Jackson, 2004, Arrow and Borzekowski, 2003).
9The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3 were collected between 2002 and
2005 by the University of Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding
provided by the US National Institute for Child Health and Human Development
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sample of 4758 youth aged 14-22 in 2002 living in the Cape Town Metropolitan
Area. The study focuses on a wide range of important and related outcomes for
youth during the transition to adulthood, including schooling and labour market
participation. All youth were initially interviewed in 2002 (wave 1) and then in
2003-2004 (wave 2), 2005 (wave 3) and 2006 (wave 4). 10
In this paper, we limit the analysis to the effect of social networks on the wages
of respondents from 15 to 24 years of age who were employed full time. This age
interval corresponds to the United Nations definition of “youth”, a period best
understood as one of transition from the dependence of childhood to the indepen-
dence of adulthood. 11 The emphasis on independence as a defining characteristic
of adulthood motivates our emphasis on full time employment.
As discussed at greater length in the World Development Report 2007 (World
Bank, 2006), the transition to adulthood is an economically important time for
at least two reasons. Firstly, youth begin to reap the rewards of investment in
human capital as they make critical decisions, in an uncertain environment, about
when to leave education and enter the labour market. Part of that uncertainty
derives from youth inexperience with employment and the search for employment:
and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wave 4 was collected in 2006 by the
University of Cape Town, University of Michigan and Princeton University. Major
funding for Wave 4 was provided by the National Institute on Aging through a
grant to Princeton University, in addition to funding provided by NICHD through
the University of Michigan.
10We do not use data from wave 1 in the analysis as the questions regarding the
key variables of interest, job finding method, were not coded in the same way as
in subsequent waves. After the first versions of this paper were written, one more
wave (wave5, 2009) became available. However, job history of respondents was
not collected in a way similar to previous waves. For these reasons, the analysis is
limited to the period 2003-2006 (waves 2 to 4).
11The lower bound of this interval also matches the age at which schooling stops
being compulsory while the upper bound matches the one in the definition of youth
by the United Nations.
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the low quality of a match with a job may only be discovered by experience.
Secondly, early bad experiences in the transition to the labour market, such as
long periods of unemployment or jobs with low wages and low skills, are scarring
experiences, disadvantaging those who suffer them in terms of their future labour
market outcomes. For that reason, whether social networks act as mechanisms
that facilitate good matches or rather simply allocate workers to jobs at low cost
(and potentially limit the range of matches available to prospective workers) is
potentially more important to youth than to older workers.
Table 3.1 presents information on both job and individual characteristics in
our sample. The first observation is that Whites’ wages are about twice that of
Africans and Coloureds. 12 Such differences in wages between race groups may be
due, at least in part, to systematic differences in education. The second observation
is that while White youth have, on average, slightly more years of education than
Africans and Coloureds, this difference is not very large, an unsurprising fact given
what others have written about generally high enrolment rates in primary and high
school across all race groups (Anderson, Case, and Lam., 1999). However, years of
education tells us nothing about differences in educational quality. We can capture
some of these differences in the results of the literacy and numeracy ability test
conducted by CAPS. 13 As shown, there are wide differences across races, with the
mean literacy and numeracy score for Whites (close to 85%) being much higher
than for Africans (barely above 50%).
Apart from differences in education, differences in family background may lead
12Hourly pay in Rands was calculated from data on monthly pay and hours
worked each month. The sample includes only those participants that provided
data on both monthly pay and monthly hours worked.
13The literacy and numeracy score measures the number of correct answers in a
test consisting of 45 questions, conducted in the the first wave of CAPS.
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to differences in a range of personal characteristics (or in the quality of a net-
work) that may be valued in the labour market. Again, we find large differences
across races, with a higher proportion of Whites coming from a financially well-off
background and living mostly in formal urban areas throughout their lives than
Africans. 14 Parents of White youth are also more educated (again measured in
years of education) than parents of youth of other race groups, and the differences
are much larger than in the current generation. The data on educational back-
ground of mothers and fathers allow us to address one other background difference:
although the importance of missing values for father’s education is always higher
than for mother’s education, this difference is relatively small in the case of Whites
(354 observations on mother’s education versus 326 observations on father’s ed-
ucation) and relatively large in the other two race groups (2128 versus 1577 and
778 versus 511 in the case of Coloureds and Africans, respectively). If we are will-
ing to speculate that such differences reflect that fewer youths are connected with
their fathers than with their mothers while growing up, then such differences are
relatively minor in the case of White youth, but relatively important in the case
of Coloured and Black youth. This result seems particularly relevant in light of
Magruder’s (2010) conclusion regarding the importance of fathers as job contacts
for their sons.
A key advantage of CAPS for the purposes of this paper is the existence of a
complete, month by month, labour market history constructed for the years 2003-
14“Family well-off during childhood” corresponds to an individual who responded
either “very comfortable” or “comfortable” when asked to characterise their fam-
ily’s financial situation as a child, while “Family poor during childhood” corre-
sponds to those who responded either “very poor” or “poor” to that same question.
“Lived mostly in formal urban areas” corresponds to those who reported having
spent most of their life in formal urban areas, as opposed to rural or informal urban
areas.
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2006 (waves 2 to 4) which also includes detailed information about job finding
methods. 15 This information is used in three ways. Firstly, it allows us to construct
different measures of work experience, including accumulated experience in the
same occupation and in the same industry, rather than simpler measures of overall
experience in the labour market. Secondly, it allows us to construct a set of
industry and occupation fixed effects which help to control for the possibility that
firms in different industries may have different search strategies for different jobs.
Finally, it allows us to quantify the importance of job search method on labour
market outcomes.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Full time Employed Respondents by Race
Variables African Obs Coloured Obs White Obs
Wages (Rands per hour) 8.68 900 12.15 2351 21.26 361
(7.25) (7.64) (21.98)
Male 0.53 900 0.52 2351 0.48 361
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Years of education 10.60 875 10.35 2335 12.12 355
(1.90) (2.03) (1.50)
Literacy and numeracy score 23.31 889 28.40 2338 38.00 356
(7.63) (7.47) (5.13)
Urban 0.43 895 0.96 2323 0.96 361
(0.49) (0.19) (0.20)
Family well off during childhood 0.24 835 0.54 2126 0.90 232
(0.42) (0.50) (0.31)
Family ok during childhood 0.51 835 0.42 2126 0.10 232
(0.50) (0.49) (0.30)
Family poor during childhood 0.25 835 0.04 2126 0.00 232
(0.43) (0.20) (0.07)
Mother’s Education 7.95 778 8.36 2128 12.08 354
(3.14) (2.64) (1.83)
Father’s Education 7.00 511 8.50 1577 12.57 326
(3.76) (3.02) (2.01)
Experience in current job 9.67 845 13.14 2319 12.31 349
(5.10) (11.29) (11.30)
Previous experience 2.01 872 6.64 2317 9.92 352
Continued on next page
15Observations of self employment, working for the family business, missing
observations and the category “other”, have been dropped. We also dropped those
jobs where the respondent was in contact with the firm because of past employment
with them.
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Table3.1 – continued from previous page
Variables African Obs Coloured Obs White Obs
(11.51) (8.91) (10.39)
Experience in same occupation 12.02 853 16.75 1886 17.47 337
(11.57) (12.95) (13.95)
Experience in same industry 11.62 555 15.00 1750 14.31 299
(11.64) (12.60) (12.44)
Relative 0.32 795 0.36 2121 0.25 291
(0.47) (0.48) (0.43)
Friend 0.36 795 0.38 2121 0.33 291
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Formal 0.32 795 0.26 2121 0.41 291
(0.47) (0.44) (0.49)
Occ: Legislators, officials, managers 0.03 853 0.03 1886 0.06 337
(0.18) (0.16) (0.23)
Occ: Professionals 0.02 853 0.05 1886 0.13 337
(0.16) (0.21) (0.34)
Occ: Technicians and assoc. professionals 0.03 853 0.07 1886 0.17 337
(0.16) (0.26) (0.37)
Occ: Clerks 0.13 853 0.17 1886 0.15 337
(0.33) (0.38) (0.36)
Occ: Service workers and shop sales workers 0.24 853 0.14 1886 0.29 337
(0.43) (0.35) (0.45)
Occ: Skilled agriculture and fishery 0.02 853 0.01 1886 0.00 337
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06)
Occ: Craft and related trades workers 0.13 853 0.20 1886 0.09 337
(0.34) (0.40) (0.29)
Occ: Plant and machine operators 0.05 853 0.07 1886 0.01 337
(0.21) (0.26) (0.12)
Occ: Elementary 0.31 853 0.22 1886 0.08 337
(0.46) (0.41) (0.27)
Occ: Other 0.04 853 0.04 1886 0.02 337
(0.04) (0.19) (0.14)
Ind: Private households 0.04 555 0.01 1750 0.02 299
(0.20) (0.11) (0.13)
Ind: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & fishing 0.01 555 0.01 1750 0.00 299
(0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Ind: Manufacturing 0.10 555 0.31 1750 0.11 299
(0.31) (0.46) (0.31)
Ind: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.01 555 0.00 1750 0.00 299
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Ind: Construction 0.11 555 0.11 1750 0.04 299
(0.32) (0.31) (0.20)
Ind: Wholesale and retail trade 0.45 555 0.31 1750 0.451 299
(0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
Ind: Transport, storage and communication 0.03 555 0.02 1750 0.01 299
(0.17) (0.16) (0.08)
Ind: Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate 0.13 555 0.12 1750 0.23 299
(0.34) (0.33) (0.42)
Ind: Community, social and personal services 0.11 555 0.08 1750 0.18 299
Continued on next page
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Table3.1 – continued from previous page
Variables African Obs Coloured Obs White Obs
(0.31) (0.28) (0.38)
Standard deviation in brackets
Regarding this last use of the data, we consider three mutually exclusive pos-
sibilities: formal methods, assistance from a relative or assistance from a friend.
Formal methods comprise responding to a newspaper advert, getting work through
an employment agency, submitting CV’s directly to, or visiting firms. Assistance
from ‘relatives’ comprises either a household member or a relative outside the
household ‘getting’ or having told the youth about the job. This includes both
the possibility that the job was at the workplace of the relative or at a different
workplace (though we exclude family businesses where youth work directly for their
family as these jobs are infrequent and sometimes associated with no formal wage).
For jobs at the workplace of the relative, it is unknown how involved the relative
might have been in the hiring process. They may or may not have directly recom-
mended the job seeker to the employer. Assistance from friends is defined similarly
to assistance from relatives, with the category excluding household members and
relatives. We will refer to friends and relatives that link a job seeker with a job
as ‘referees’. The two variables, ‘friends’ and ‘relatives’, express the importance of
social networks and differ in the assumed social proximity between the job seeker
and the referee, as we assume that relatives are socially closer than friends. What
Table 3.1 shows is that there are important differences in terms of how youth find
a job: although it is clear that all race groups use social networks to find a large
portion of their jobs, Whites successfully used formal methods in about 40% of
the jobs while the corresponding number for Africans and Coloureds is slightly less
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than 1/3 and slightly above 1/4 of the jobs, respectively. There are also differences
regarding the relative importance of relatives versus friends: conditional on finding
a job through social networks, Whites are slightly more reliant on friends (57% of
their network found jobs are through friends) than Coloureds and Africans (52%
and 53%, respectively).
Before we present the analysis of the relation between search method and wage,
it is important to qualify the importance of social networks. Table 3.2 shows that,
of the 1132 individuals who had more than one job (representing more than 80%
of our sample of individuals), 193 (or 17% of the sub-sample) found all jobs using
formal methods. If we add to this number the 279 individuals (25% of the sub-
sample) who found jobs using a mix of formal methods and social contacts (either
friends, relatives or both), we see that over 40% of the individuals in the sample
have some experience with formal search methods. As expected, given what is
stated above, this percentage is slightly higher for Whites (64%) than Africans
and Coloureds (43% and 39% respectively).
Table 3.3 further qualifies the importance of social networks. It presents the
choice of job search method by respondents who are full time employed and actively
searching for a different job, by how they found their last job. The most noticeable
aspect is that in only 3% of these searches do respondents rely exclusively on social
networks, and this is true irrespective of whether they had been successful in using
this method in securing their current job. In contrast, the rule is to use both formal
methods and social networks, a strategy adopted in almost 80% of the cases for
which we have information. Similarly, table 3.3 presents the job search methods
of the full time employed by education level. Regardless of education level, there
is a strong tendency to use both formal search and network search in combination.
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Table 3.2: Number of individuals by job finding method
All African Coloureds Whites
Found jobs using relatives, friends and formal methods 27 4 19 4
Found jobs using relatives and formal search 106 25 122 10
Found jobs using friends and formal search 146 34 95 17
Found jobs using friends and relatives 159 27 122 10
Found all jobs using relatives 247 72 171 4
Found all jobs using friends 254 69 170 15
Found all jobs using formal methods 193 66 106 21
Total 1132 297 755 80
Used formal methods at least once 472 129 292 51
(41.7%) (43.4%) (38.7%) (63.8%)
Also, for all races and for all education levels, exclusive network search is never
more popular than exclusive search with formal methods. Clearly, there does not
seem to exist any specialization in job search method (either the use of formal
methods or social networks) in this sample. 16
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 seem to suggest that this conclusion is not specific to any
occupation or industry. Table 3.5 also allows us to conclude about the relative
importance of social networks in finding jobs with different skill levels. 17 There is
some evidence that differences in required skills lead to privileging hiring through
16These results, taken together with the importance of social networks as evi-
denced in table 3.1, seem to lend support to the conclusion that social networks
are productive, in the sense that, when used, they tend to lead to higher offer
rates. See Mouw (2003) for a review and Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore (2000),
Fernandez and Weinberg (1997), Petersen and Seidel (2000) for examples.
17Occupations are classified according to the South African Standard Classifi-
cation of Occupations. These are mapped into skill levels using an adaptation
of the International Standard Classification of Occupation due to Ziervogel and
Crankshaw (2009) and also used by Keswell, Girdwood, and Leibbrandt (2012).
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Table 3.5: Job finding method by occupation
Variable Obs Networks Skill
Proportion SD Level
Occ: Legislators, officials, managers 86 0.63 0.48 4
Occ: Professionals 123 0.61 0.49 4
Occ: Technicians and associate professionals 174 0.56 0.50 3
Occ: Clerks 436 0.60 0.49 2
Occ: Service workers and shop sales workers 487 0.58 0.49 2
Occ: Skilled agriculture and fishery 22 0.86 0.34 2
Occ: Craft and related trades workers 476 0.85 0.36 2
Occ: Plant and machine operators 173 0.83 0.38 2
Occ: Elementary 648 0.80 0.40 1
Occ: Other 96 0.74 0.44 1
Observations 2806
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Table 3.6: Job finding method by industry
Variable Obs Networks
Proportion SD
Ind: Private households 47 0.79 0.41
Ind: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & fishing 28 0.91 0.29
Ind: Manufacturing 570 0.81 0.39
Ind: Electricity, gas and water supply 7 0.52 0.50
Ind: Construction 239 0.88 0.33
Ind: Wholesale and retail trade 819 0.67 0.47
Ind: Transport, storage and communication 62 0.81 0.39
Ind: Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate 311 0.63 0.48
Ind: Community, social and personal services 205 0.50 0.50
Observations 2288
social networks, but it points in an opposite relation from what we would expect
from the “good matches” hypothesis: the importance of social networks increases
as the skills level of the job decreases (79% of the jobs in the lowest skill category
are filled through social networks, substantially more than in the highest skill
category, 62%).
Summarizing this discussion so far, while networks are widely used and are
productive, there does not seem to exist a strong preference for specialization,
either at the level of individuals (or firms, defined by industry or occupation) in
terms of searching (or hiring) through networks. In the next section we will show
that, nevertheless, finding a job through social networks does have an important
and independent impact on wages.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
We are interested in estimating a wage equation of the type
Wij = αXi + γZj + β(S ∗R)ij + δTij + θi + εij (3.1)
where Wij is the log of wage of individual i in job j (in Rands per hour), Xi
is a vector of individual characteristics that are valued in the labour market (in
this case gender and years of education), Zj is a vector of job characteristics (in
practice, a vector of industry and occupation fixed effects), Tij is a vector of time
variant characteristics (previous experience and tenure in current job, as well as
year fixed effects), and, finally, (S ∗ R)ij are our main variables of interest, the
interaction between race (African, Coloured and Whites) and the method used to
find the specific job under analysis (Relatives, Friends or Formal).
We estimate equation 3.1 using observations from waves 2, 3 and 4 of CAPS
for which we have information on wages, hours worked and the job search method
that led to the job.18 There are multiple observations per individual, forming an
unbalanced panel. This structure of the data is reflected in the decomposition of
the error term in two components, one of which is individual-specific and time
invariant (θi).
We start by estimating equation 3.1 using a random effects estimator, under the
assumption that all the right hand side variables are uncorrelated with the error
term, θi + εij. Although this is perhaps a strong assumption, it seems defensible
given the nature of our data and the variety of individual and job controls that we
18The CAPS data include a “mega job” table that assigns a unique job number
to each job per respondent and records the months in which each job was worked in
across waves 2, 3 and 4. We excluded observations from wave 1 of CAPS because
the job search variable was coded differently.
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can include in the estimation. Additionally, random effects estimators are more
efficient than the fixed effects estimators and this may matter when, as in our
sample, there is limited variation across jobs for some of the independent variables
of interest (in this case, job search method) which could lead to large standard
errors.
The results, for different sets of control variables, corresponding to different
assumptions regarding what firms value and can observe, are presented in table 3.7.
In column (1), we present the estimates for a simple model where wage depends on
job finding method, human capital variables, gender and race. The human capital
variables consist of years of education and months of work experience in current
and previous jobs, months of occupation and industry-specific experience, and
education quality measured through the literacy and numeracy score. Focusing
on the coefficients of the interaction between race and job search method, it is
immediately obvious that there are two types of penalties (the comparison category
is White × formal): firstly, and as expected, Africans receive lower wages than
Coloured, who in turn receive lower wages than Whites and, secondly, finding a
job through social networks (either relatives or friends) carries an additional wage
penalty.
It is possible that job characteristics vary systematically according to search
methods, that is, that the wage discounts identified in column (1) simply reflect the
nature of the work that social networks connect job seekers with. For that reason,
we include a set of industry and occupation fixed effects in the model presented in
column (2) (although the estimates associated with these variables are omitted).
Finally, in column (3), we also control for individual characteristics such as family
background, as proxy both to characteristics that are potentially valued in the
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Table 3.7: Wages and search method: random effects estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3)
African x relative -0.587*** -0.584*** -0.383***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.131)
African x friend -0.632*** -0.626*** -0.448***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.129)
African x formal -0.427*** -0.409*** -0.320**
(0.095) (0.094) (0.132)
Coloured x relative -0.318*** -0.349*** -0.194**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.091)
Coloured x friend -0.342*** -0.369*** -0.177*
(0.079) (0.080) (0.092)
Coloured x formal -0.219*** -0.239*** -0.107
(0.081) (0.081) (0.093)
White x relative -0.258** -0.222* -0.154
(0.108) (0.113) (0.129)
White x friend -0.171* -0.161* -0.116
(0.092) (0.091) (0.103)
Male 0.175*** 0.143*** 0.136***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037)
Years of education 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.077***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Literacy and numeracy score 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
First recorded job -0.114*** -0.090*** -0.075**
(0.031) (0.029) (0.037)
Not working or studying prior to current job 0.048
(0.037)
Experience in current job 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Previous experience 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience in same occupation 0.004** 0.003* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Experience in same industry -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Urban 0.055
(0.064)
Family background: well-off -0.074
(0.067)
Family background: ok -0.103*
(0.061)
Mother’s education 0.012
(0.007)
Father’s education 0.011*
(0.006)
Observations 2,154 2,154 1,145
Number of respondents 1,406 1,406 736
Robust standard errors in parentheses. An interaction variable for
“already working at start of CAPS” x “previous experience”,
time dummies, and a constant were included but not reported
Occupation and industry dummies were included in (2) & (3)
but are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table 3.8: Wages and search method: random effects estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3)
African x relative -0.444*** -0.442*** -0.318***
African x friend -0.468*** -0.465*** -0.361***
African x formal -0.348*** -0.336*** -0.274**
Coloured x relative -0.272*** -0.295*** -0.176**
Coloured x friend -0.290*** -0.309*** -0.162*
Coloured x formal -0.197*** -0.213*** -0.101
White x relative -0.227** -0.199* -0.143
White x friend -0.157* -0.149* -0.110
Observations 2,154 2,154 1,145
Number of respondents 1,406 1,406 736
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
labour market or to the quality of the social contacts to which youth have access
to.
It is noticeable that the inclusion of industry and occupation fixed effects does
not change our earlier conclusions in any meaningful way (as perhaps would be
expected, given the data on job search presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, discussed
above). This suggests that the cause of wage penalties is not simply because social
networks allocate prospective workers to low paying jobs. The same is not true
when considering the estimates presented in column (3): not only are the estimates
of the effect of social networks generally much lower, they are no longer statistically
significant in the case of White youth. Apart from father’s education, the remaining
four family background variables are not individually significant though they do
pass a t-test for joint significance at the 5% level of significance. In principle, we
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Table 3.9: Respondents with all data vs. respondents with missing data
All data Missing data
Variables mean mean p-value
African 0.165 0.230 0.000
(0.011) (0.013)
Coloured 0.73 0.67 0.004
(0.013) (0.014)
White 0.106 0.097 0.513
(0.009) (0.009)
Relative 0.166 0.174 0.600
(0.011) (0.011)
Friend 0.359 0.400 0.048
(0.014) (0.015)
Formal 0.300 0.258 0.031
(0.014) (0.014)
Male 0.544 0.505 0.073
(0.015) (0.016)
Years of education 10.740 10.374 0.000
(0.057) (0.064)
Literacy and numeracy score 28.882 27.704 0.001
(0.236) (0.259)
Observations 1,145 1009
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
113
would prefer this last estimation which has a larger number of control variables,
particularly given that we are using a random effects estimator and we may worry
about problems of correlation between some of the explanatory variables and the
error term. However, it is important to note that due to missing values in some
of the variables, the inclusion of these variables substantially reduces the sample
size. To check the possibility that some of the differences between coefficients in
column (3) and column (2) are due to differences in sample composition, we present
in table 3.9, t-tests of the means of the sample in column 3, and the sample of
additional individuals in the first two estimations that did not provide data for all
the family background variables. It can be seen that for most key demographic
variables and two of the job finding variables, these two samples of youth are the
same. However, we cannot rule out possible differences between the samples due
to unobservables.
Although they are not the focus of this analysis, it seems important to notice
that the estimates of the effect of education and experience are positive, as ex-
pected, and relatively robust to the inclusion of additional covariates. The main
surprise is the general lack of importance of the variables measuring individual
background, although we must note again the importance of missing values, which
reduces the sample size to roughly half the original sample.
As it is known the coefficients of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models
such as these cannot be directly interpreted. In table 3.8 we present the wage
penalties associated with the race × job search variables using the correction pro-
posed by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). We find no evidence that using networks
leads to wage premiums, and thus no evidence of the good matches hypothesis.
Consistent with the limited choices hypothesis, while more jobs are found through
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social networks for Africans than for Whites (see table 3.2 above), this is clearly
not because Africans can secure higher wages through social networks. Finally, we
notice that, for all races, the coefficients for the ‘relative’ and the ‘friend’ interac-
tion variables are not significantly different to each other. This means that there
is no evidence from these results that social distance between the worker and their
referee has an effect on wage.
A fixed effects estimator may still be preferred if the random effects estimates
are inconsistent. For that reason, we estimate a fixed effects specification of equa-
tion 3.1
Wij = θi + αX
′
i + γZj + βSij + δTij + εij (3.2)
where X ′i includes those individual characteristics that are valued in the labour
market and are time variant, Sij is a vector of dummy variables indicating the
search method, θi is an individual fixed effect and all other variables have the same
meaning as above. The estimates, separate for each race group, are presented in
table 3.10. 19 It should be noted that while fixed effects estimation controls for
all time invariant heterogeneity, we cannot discount the possibility that there is
also some unobservable time variant heterogeneity across individuals that may
affect our estimates and that is not controlled for. However, that different types
of individuals may specialise in different job search methods is likely to be the
key source of heterogeneity that may lead to inconsistency of the random effects
estimates. This is not a problem with the fixed effects estimates as they exclude
individuals that only find jobs using one type of search method. These estimates
19Because race is time invariant, it is not possible to include race and search
interaction terms in a fixed effects estimation, as we did in table 3.7.
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are identified by the existence of changes in successful job search strategy, that
is, by individuals who had more than one job between 2002-2006 and who found
those jobs using different search methods. As shown in table 3.2, the identifying
sample is approximately 1/3 of the total sample.
The coefficients for the main variables of interest (finding a job through friends
or through relatives) are presented, as elasticities, in Table 3.11, again using the
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) correction. Two conclusions emerge from these
results. The first is that the use of either friends or relatives carries a penalty in
terms of wages. This is true for all race groups, reinforcing our earlier conclusion
that there is no evidence to support the good matches hypothesis. Considering that
there is much evidence to support positive wage premiums for social network use
(Topa, 2011) and that few studies find wage discounts for several major population
groups (and not in excess of 10%), this is a significant finding that is broadly
consistent with the limited choices hypothesis.
The second conclusion is that, unlike the random effects estimates, the wage
penalties associated with the use of relatives as referees are always larger than the
penalties associated with the use of friends. The differences are relatively small
in the case of Coloured and White youth (as in the random effects estimates) but
quite large in the case of African youth. These results suggest that employers
may suspect some degree of opportunistic behaviour from referees and react by
discounting the value of the information provided by those referees who are closer
to job seekers.
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Table 3.10: Wages and search method: fixed effects estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variables African Coloured White
Relative -0.645*** -0.161** -0.361**
(0.185) (0.077) (0.154)
Friend -0.120 -0.135* -0.347***
(0.099) (0.079) (0.108)
Years of Education -0.018 0.013 0.001
(0.063) (0.044) (0.071)
First recorded job -0.326* -0.141*** 0.074
(0.195) (0.046) (0.135)
Experience in current job 0.043*** 0.016** -0.011
(0.016) (0.008) (0.022)
Previous experience -0.026 0.013* -0.006
(0.018) (0.008) (0.022)
Experience in same occupation 0.045*** 0.007** 0.005
(0.017) (0.004) (0.010)
Experience in same industry -0.066*** -0.008** 0.005
(0.019) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 426 1,521 221
Number of respondents 328 941 147
Robust standard errors in parentheses. An interaction variable for
“already working at start of CAPS” x “previous experience”,
time dummies, industry and occupation dummies and a constant
were also included but are not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table 3.11: Wages and search method: fixed effects estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variables African Coloured White
Relative -0.475*** -0.148** -0.303**
Friend -0.113 -0.126* -0.293***
Observations 426 1,521 221
Number of respondents 328 941 147
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
3.5 Conclusion
It is well known that social networks play a significant role in labour markets in
many countries, including developing countries. However, the significance of this
fact for labour market outcomes, namely wages, is still not clear. This paper is mo-
tivated by two competing hypotheses regarding these effects, the “good matches”
hypothesis (which predicts that the use of social networks would lead to higher
wages) and the “limited choices” hypothesis (which predicts that wages will be
lower or unaffected by social networks when people limit their choices to the jobs
available through one’s social networks). We contribute to this discussion by fo-
cusing on the motivation of the referee and the possibility that she/he may not
select individuals with the highest possible ability - instead privileging individuals
who are socially closer. Firms react by offering lower wages.
We use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) of South Africa to
estimate the wage effect of contact use and of social proximity. Controlling for
individual heterogeneity in characteristics that are valued in the labour market
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(through a range of human capital and family background variables) and also for
unobserved heterogeneity (through the use of fixed effects), we show that there are
penalties associated with the use of social networks for all race groups, ranging from
about 11% - 48%. In addition, for Africans these penalties are compounded by
the proximity between job seeker and referee: referrals from relatives carry a very
large penalty in contrast to no penalty associated with friends. Interestingly, we do
not find any convincing evidence of this for Coloureds or Whites. This may reflect
either historical discrimination as an inheritance of apartheid, or different labour
market conditions faced by African youth. This result also suggests that if the
referred individual is from a disadvantaged group, faced with limited employment
choices (as is more likely the case for African youth), then the probability that
referees will suggest less capable workers should be higher - and so would be the
associated wage penalties imposed by employers.
Lastly, it must be noted that even if using contacts leads to lower wages, their
use may be associated with a higher probability of finding a job, which may be espe-
cially important in the case of young people who are starting their careers. Hence,
our results cannot be interpreted as suggesting that youth should not search for
jobs using their social connections. Instead, it would be better if youth had more
opportunities to productively use formal search methods. Previous literature (Ma-
gruder, 2010) has already argued that social networks may perpetuate inequality
across generations in South Africa. In addition to this issue of equity, we have
identified an inefficiency in the way workers are matched to employment that re-
sults from social network use. Together, these two findings suggest that policy
makers should consider ways of further supporting formal job search methods that
would facilitate relatively better matches and lessen the prevalence of youth being
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disadvantaged by limited choices.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion
The two key economic transitions to adulthood regarding education and the labour
market both involve problems of imperfect information. Firstly, youth have to
decide on the right amount of investment in education and may not have accurate
information about its returns, leading to sub-optimal investment. Secondly, youth
may use friends and family to search for work as they are not always able to find
employment through formal search methods. These informal search methods could
be a problem if they lead to poor matches between jobs and workers, indicated by
wage discounts.
Both decisions underlying the economic transition to adulthood may possibly
be improved through information interventions targeting either of these issues.
However, there is limited previous research regarding the best way to design infor-
mation interventions about the returns to education. Particularly, the potential
for such interventions to cause harm has been ignored. In addition, there is limited
empirical research on the accuracy of expectations regarding education returns in
developing countries. Also, in the context of South Africa there is no previous
research on the wage impacts of using social networks to find jobs. More generally,
there is no consensus in the empirical literature across other countries regarding
whether the impact of using social networks is positive or negative. This thesis
investigates these issues in chapters 2 and 3, respectively.
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In chapter 2, the potential impact of information provision on the returns to
education is analysed using a real options model of investment in grade 12 with
data from CAPS on observed and expected earnings conditional on different levels
of education. Simulations for the potential impact of four designs of information
interventions demonstrate that each intervention may reduce the accuracy of ex-
pectations of at least one race group and thus, none can be recommended for
the context we consider. The main contribution of this chapter is to show the
importance of considering three critical factors when designing an information in-
tervention and anticipating its potential impacts. Unless the sequential nature of
education investment choices, heterogeneity in the returns to education and the
process by which expectations are updated are all considered ex ante, the poten-
tial for harm may go undetected. This is true regardless of the accuracy of the
information that is to be provided. This, to my knowledge, is the first research
to demonstrate that the provision of accurate information (even full information),
may result in reduced accuracy of expectations. Particularly concerning in the con-
text we consider, is that underestimation of the returns to education (and hence
underinvestment) may be caused by accurate information provision to African
youth (who may be considered to be relatively disadvantaged in both education
and the labour market).
Further research is needed regarding the effectiveness of different types of infor-
mation interventions designed to assist youth with education choices. Chapter 2
only considered 4 specific types of intervention designs and their potential impact
on expectations accuracy. Firstly, one limitation of most previous research is that
the effectiveness of interventions is measured only in terms of changes in expecta-
tions and investment decisions. Measuring long term welfare measures such as life
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time earnings or job satisfaction may be a more useful indicator when job char-
acteristics other than wages are important, though only one paper, by Borghans,
Golsteyn, and Stenberg (2011), has done this. They use variation in study coun-
seling practices in Dutch Schools as an instrumental variable (IV) to evaluate the
impact of counseling on the quality of educational choice, measured by future job
satisfaction. They find that one standard deviation more of study counselling is
associated with a 2 percent reduction in the probability of having made a low
quality education investment choice though the exact variation in counselling that
leads to this is unknown. Further research could explore the long term impacts of
different designs of information interventions.
In addition, further research could explore a broader range of short term im-
pacts from information interventions. For example, Dinkelman, Mart´ınez et al.
(2012) find information provision to be largely ineffective when targeting grade 8
students in Chile. They examined the impact of showing DVD’s to these students,
of young disadvantaged adults who tell their stories of transitions toward college
or vocational school. While the presentation did result in increased knowledge of
financial aid among the students and also, decreased absenteeism, overall enrol-
ment decisions and grade scores were unaffected. This suggests that some types of
information interventions may have a complex range of effects that existing theo-
retical and empirical research cannot explain. Lastly, beyond having implications
for information interventions targeted at education choices, the analysis and results
of chapter 2 have much broader implications.
Any decision that could be modelled with a real options framework and be the
target of information provision, such as investment in agriculture (Hertzler, 2007),
could be analysed ex ante using an approach that is similar to ours. Also, when-
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ever there is quantifiable heterogeneity in the outcome of an economic decision
and that decision is the target of information provision, a similar approach to ours
could be used to evaluate the impact of the information provided. For example,
recommendations for alcohol consumption before driving are sometimes provided
in the measure of standard drinks per hour for men and women, but without quan-
titative information about the exact nature of this heterogeneity. The incidence of
low range drink driving and the defence of some such drivers (that they only had
a few drinks and didn’t expect to be over the limit), suggests that more accurate
and detailed information regarding the relation between blood alcohol level and
alcohol consumption might be better, though this would depend on the sequential
nature of alcohol consumption, and the way in which alcohol consumers update
their expectations. In general, the cost of analysing different designs of interven-
tions and their potential impacts ex ante should generally be very small compared
to testing interventions using field experiments (though the latter has clearly been
the preference of recent research). Also, ex ante analysis provides the benefit of
anticipating negative impacts before they occur and avoiding them through careful
intervention design. More experimental research regarding the way people respond
to different types of information would also be useful, but it may better to conduct
such research in lab experiments where no important life decisions are at stake.
Chapter 3 investigates two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of social
networks and wages and consequently, whether or not the widespread use of social
networks in the South African labour market is cause for concern. In addition, we
contribute to the broader debate on the “good matches” hypothesis (which pre-
dicts that the use of social networks would lead to higher wages) and the “limited
choices” hypothesis (which predicts that wages will be lower or unaffected by social
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networks when people limit their choices to the jobs available through one’s social
networks). Unlike most previous research, we also address the motivation of the
referee and the possibility that s/he may not select individuals that are the most
suitable for a particular job. Firms may be willing to hire referred individuals
who are not suitable because it is less costly than finding workers through formal
mechanisms. As a result however, network found jobs on average should be lower
paid than formally found jobs.
We use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) of South Africa to
estimate the wage effect of contact use and of social proximity. Controlling for in-
dividual heterogeneity in characteristics that are valued in the labour market, job
characteristics and also for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we show that
there are penalties associated with the use of social networks for all race groups,
ranging from about 11% - 48%. In addition, for Africans these penalties are com-
pounded by the proximity between job seeker and referee: referrals from relatives
carry a very large penalty in contrast to no penalty associated with friends. Inter-
estingly we do not find any convincing evidence of this for Coloureds or Whites.
This may reflect either historical discrimination as an inheritance of apartheid,
or different labour market conditions faced by African youth. This result also
suggests that if the referred individual is from a disadvantaged group, faced with
limited employment choices (as is more likely the case for African youth), then
the probability that referees will suggest less capable workers should be higher -
and so should be the associated wage penalties imposed by employers. However,
further research is needed on the role played by social networks in labour markets,
specifically on the exact mechanisms that may lead to wage penalties.
While chapter 3 did not consider information interventions directly, the identi-
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fication of these wage effects, reflecting a potential inefficiency in the way workers
are matched to with jobs through social network use, together with the finding
of Magruder (2010), that social networks may perpetuate inequality across gen-
erations, implies that policy makers should consider ways of further supporting
formal job search methods, for example, through policies that provide youth with
information about suitable job opportunities. Job search assistance interventions
may produce efficiency gains in two ways. Firstly, they may reduce the average
duration of unemployment. Secondly, they may lead to better quality matches.
While the possibility of the first efficiency gain arises simply from the incidence of
unemployment, the possibility of the second efficiency gain depends on the relative
matching performance of formal search compared to informal search (as investi-
gated in chapter 3). Little is known regarding the effectiveness of different designs
of information interventions targeting job search behaviour, though there are some
recent studies in this area. Beam (2013) conducted an information intervention
experiment in the Philippines, that tested the provision of a voucher to attend a
job fair on randomly treated individuals’ job search behaviour. In the two months
following the fair, individuals’ chance of searching for work was more than doubled.
Also, Dammert, Galdo, and Galdo (2013) test the impact of sending job-market
information to job-seekers via sms messages in Peru and find that the information
increases expectations of finding work. If it is true that these types of information
interventions can help youth to find work through formal matching mechanisms,
these policies may be particularly applicable in contexts where informal matching
mechanisms do not work well (indicated by wage penalties) and are responsible
for a large proportion of job matches, such as South Africa. More research in this
area would be worthwhile.
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